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I. Introduction 
It is widely recognized that inequality of labor market earnings in the 
United States grew dramatically in recent decades. This trend may be 
seen in Figure 4.1, which plots the growth of real hourly wages of U.S. 
workers (both male and female) by earnings percentile for the years 1973 
through 2005. Over the course of more than three decades, wage growth 
was weak to nonexistent at the bottom of the distribution, strong at the 
top of the distribution, and modest at the middle. While real hourly earn-
ings of workers in the bottom 30 percent of the earnings distribution rose 
by no more than 10 percentage points, earnings of workers at the 90th 
percentile rose by more than 40 percentage points. 
What is much less widely known, however, is that this smooth, mono-
tone growth of wage inequality is a feature of a speciﬁ  c time period—and 
that this time period has passed.1 Figure 4.2 shows that, consistent with 
common perceptions, the growth of wage inequality between 1973 and 
1989 was strikingly linear in wage percentiles, with sharp falls in real 
wages at the bottom of the distribution and modest increases at the top.2 
Yet, starting in the late 1980s, the growth of wages “polarized,” with 
strong, ongoing wage growth in the top of the earnings distribution, 
meaning at or above the 70th percentile,  and modest growth in the lower 
tail of the distribution, deﬁ  ned as at or below the 30th percentile. Nota-
bly, the portion of the wage distribution that saw the least real earnings 
growth between 1989 and 2005 was the “middle” group, roughly the 
earners between the 30th and 70th percentiles of the distribution.3 Thus, 
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Figure 4.1 
Changes in Real Log Hourly Earnings of All U.S. Workers from 1973 to
2005 by Percentile of the Hourly Earnings Distribution
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inequality: the ﬁ  rst one is characterized by diverging wages throughout 
the distribution, and the second displays polarizing wage growth. 
These two epochs are contrasted in Figure 4.3, which plots the evolu-
tion of the ratio of 90th to 50th percentile hourly earnings alongside the 
evolution of the ratio of 50th to 10th percentile hourly earnings.4 The 
90/50 ratio rises smoothly and secularly from 1979 to 2004. By contrast, 
the 50/10 ratio rises sharply from 1979 to 1987, plateaus in 1988, and 
then reverses course for the remainder of the time period. The divergent 
growth of upper- and lower-tail wage inequality in the 1980s and 1990s 
is also corroborated by microeconomic data on wages and total compen-
sation from the establishment-based Employment Cost Index (see Pierce 
2001). The steady growth of upper tier earnings inequality is seen in ris-
ing shares of wages paid to the top 10 and top 1 percent of U.S. earners 
since the late 1970s, as revealed in tax data (see Piketty and Saez 2003).
This paper evaluates the sources of the growth and then the polar-
ization of earnings inequality in the United States, and considers these 
implications for the future growth of labor demand, by which we mean 
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the demand for workers at various skill levels.5 We begin by reviewing 
basic trends in earnings levels by education groups over several decades, 
and show how the pattern of polarization visible in Figure 4.2 is also 
reﬂ   ected in trends in earnings by education level. We next consider 
whether these patterns of changing earnings by educational level can 
be adequately explained by canonical labor demand models of the type 
used by Katz and Murphy (1992);  Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998); 
Card and Lemieux (2001); and Acemoglu (2002),  among many others. 
Though these models do an excellent job of explaining the evolution of 
U.S. income inequality to 1992, their explanatory power fares poorly 
thereafter, which suggests a substantial change, or structural break, in the 
character of labor demand over the last 15 years. 
We brieﬂ  y consider whether the widely discussed institutional explana-
tions for rising U.S. wage inequality—most particularly, ﬂ  uctuations in 
the U.S. minimum wage and the tight labor market of the 1990s—provide 
a sufﬁ  cient alternative explanation for these same patterns. While these 
Figure 4.2 
Changes in Real Log Hourly Earnings of Men and Women from 1973 to 
1989 and from 1989 to 2005 by Percentile of the Hourly Earnings 
Distributions
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two speciﬁ  c factors are likely to have contributed to rising inequality, 
particularly in the 1980s, neither one provides a viable explanation for 
the long-term secular growth of high incomes seen in the 1970s through 
1990s, nor for the plateau and slight rebound of low incomes observed 
during the 1990s. 
We next discuss how technological change and, more recently, inter-
national outsourcing, may provide a plausible, albeit still preliminary, 
explanation for the polarization of earnings growth. Following the con-
ceptual model offered by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), we argue 
that technological change (recently abetted by outsourcing) has been 
complementary to high-education occupations, particularly deleterious 
to middle-education occupations, and neither strongly complementary 
to nor strongly deleterious to (meaning substitutable for) low-education 
service occupations. A key implication of this conceptual framework 
is that computerization may foster a demand-driven polarization of 
labor market activities. Corroborating this implication, we present initial 
evidence that the observed polarization of earnings inequality is demand- 
Figure 4.3 
Ratios of 90th to 50th and 50th to 10th Percentile Real Hourly Earnings, 
1974–2004 (Three-Year Moving Averages)
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driven. Drawing on this model, we speculate on the changing shape of 
labor demand in the United States, which in the future we argue will be 
characterized by rapid growth of managerial and professional occupa-
tions and rapid growth of comparatively low-education service employ-
ment. 
The ﬁ  nal section of the paper focuses on three sets of research and pol-
icy issues that impinge on how the changing shape of labor demand will 
affect employment opportunities and earnings inequality in the United 
States. The ﬁ  rst set of issues considers potential supply responses in the 
form of human capital investment and immigration policy. A second set 
considers the role of labor standards and social welfare policy in shaping 
the quality of future jobs, particularly service jobs. The third and ﬁ  nal 
set of issues considers areas of theory and measurement needing urgent 
attention for improving our understanding of how changes in technology 
and trade will affect U.S. labor demand in the ensuing decades. 
II. Measuring  Earnings  Inequality
To summarize the basic changes in the U.S. wage structure over the last 
four decades, we draw on two large and representative household data 
sources: the March Current Population Survey (CPS) and the combined 
CPS May and Outgoing Rotation Group samples. The March CPS data 
provide reasonably comparable data on prior year’s annual earnings, 
weeks worked, and hours worked per week for four decades. We use 
the March ﬁ  les from 1964 to 2006, which  cover earnings from 1963 to 
2005, to form a sample of real weekly earnings for workers ages 16 to 64 
years who participate in the labor force on a full-time, full-year (FTFY) 
basis, deﬁ  ned as working 35-plus hours per week and 40-plus weeks per 
year. We complement the March FTFY series data with data on hourly 
wages of all current labor force participants using May CPS samples for 
1973 through 1978 and CPS Outgoing Rotation Group samples for 1979 
through 2003 (CPS May/ORG). From these sources, we construct hourly 
wage data for all wage and salary workers employed during the CPS 
sample survey reference week.6 
We focus on two measures of relative earnings. The ﬁ  rst is inequality in 
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50 and 50-10 log wage gaps, which we refer to as upper- and lower-tail 
inequality. These trends are depicted above in Figure 4.3. The second is 
“between-group” inequality, which we measure using the earnings levels 
and earnings differentials among workers of different educational attain-
ments.7 Figure 4.4 displays these earnings trends for full-time, full-year 
workers by educational attainment for the years 1963 to 2005.8 In this 
ﬁ  gure, the average earnings for each educational attainment level in 1963 
are normalized to zero, and subsequent data points represent the loga-
rithmic change in earnings (approximately equal to the percentage point 
change) since 1963. Wage levels are indexed using the Personal Con-
sumption Expenditure deﬂ  ator, and are composition-adjusted to hold 
constant the gender and labor market experience of workers within each 
educational group at their average levels over 1963 to 2005. 
Figure 4.4 reveals the four major episodes in the evolution of between-
group inequality in the United States. From 1963 to 1973, real wages 
grew strongly for all educational groups. Since growth rates were rela-
tively comparable across educational levels (with the exception of work-
Figure 4.4 
Changes in Composition-Adjusted Real Log Weekly Full-Time Wages of U.S. 
Men by Education, 1963–2005
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ers with a postcollege education), these sharp gains were not accompanied 
by a signiﬁ  cant rise in between-group inequality. Following the 1973 
oil shock, earnings levels stagnated for all educational groups, while 
income inequality remained largely steady. Commencing in 1979, income 
inequality rose rapidly even as average earnings remained stagnant. The 
real wages of workers with a four-year college degree or postcollege edu-
cation increased signiﬁ  cantly, while the real wages of those with a high 
school degree or less plummeted. Most recently, from the early 1990s for-
ward, overall earnings levels have risen again, but this growth has been 
bimodal: the earnings of less educated workers (those with a high school 
degree or lower/less) rose modestly, the earnings of the most highly edu-
cated (those with postcollege education) rose extremely rapidly, and the 
earnings growth of those with some college education was comparatively 
weak. Thus, the polarization of overall earnings growth in the 1990s, as 
depicted in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, is reﬂ  ected in a contemporaneous polar-
ization of earnings across education groups. 
III.  Rising Inequality: The Role of Demand Shifts for College-
Educated Versus Non-College-Educated Workers
To interpret the forces shaping the rise and subsequent polarization of 
wage inequality—and to forecast its future trajectory—it is critical to 
assess the degree to which shifts in labor demand are responsible for the 
observed patterns. In this section, we ask whether the rising wages of 
workers with high levels of educational attainment versus those with low 
levels of educational attainment can be explained by a combination of 
demand and supply shifts that favor more educated workers. A particu-
larly simple and attractive formulation of this supply-demand framework 
posits that there are two major skill groups in the labor market, those 
with at least four-year college degrees and those with high school degrees. 
Both skill groups, termed college equivalents and high school equiva-
lents, are in demand as employees by ﬁ  rms and, critically, these groups 
are imperfect substitutes in production. Thus, an increase in the relative 
supply of one group reduces its earnings relative to the other group.9 
Figure 4.5 illustrates the intuitive appeal of this conceptual frame-
work. In this ﬁ  gure, the series labeled “Log Wage Differential” plots How Structural Shifts in Labor Demand Affect Labor Supply Prospects 168
the composition-adjusted log college/high school earnings gap for 1963 
through 2005. Consistent with the more disaggregated earnings series 
summarized in Figure 4.4, the college/high school gap rises in the 1960s, 
contracts modestly in the 1970s, and then expands rapidly from 1981 
forward. By 2005, the college/high school gap has attained its highest 
level—94 percent or 66 log points—since 1915 (see Goldin and Katz 
2007). This gap is nearly double the 1963 level of 49 percent (40 log 
points). The second series in Figure 4.5, labeled “Log Relative Supply,” 
depicts the evolution of the composition-adjusted supply of college-edu-
cated relative to high-school-educated workers in the same time period. 
This series reveals an acceleration of the growth in the relative supply of 
college workers in the 1970s compared to the 1960s, followed by a dra-
matic slowdown starting in 1982. Notably, this deceleration, caused by 
slowing college attainment among cohorts of youth born after 1950 (see 
Card and Lemieux 2000), corresponds closely with the sharp jump in the 
college/high school wage premium after 1981. Thus, the juxtaposition 
of these series suggests that ﬂ  uctuations in the rate of supply growth of 
Figure 4.5 
College Relative to High School Labor Supply and the College-High School 
Wage Differential, 1963–2005
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college-educated workers, overlaid on secularly rising demand for college 
workers, may provide a reasonable summary explanation for the growth 
of college wage premium. Indeed, this hypothesis was famously espoused 
by Katz and Murphy in 1992, who found that it provided an excellent ﬁ  t 
for trends in the college wage premium for the years 1963 to 1987, their 
data set’s ending year. 
To explore the power of this framework for more recent trends in 
inequality, we re-estimate the Katz-Murphy model using earnings data 
extended to 2005, thus going 18 more years beyond their original work. 
Our illustrative conceptual framework starts with a Constant Elasticity 
of Substitution  production function for aggregate output Q with two 
factors, college equivalents (c) and high school equivalents (h):
(1)  Qt = [αt(atNct)ρ + (1 − αt)(btNht)ρ]1/ρ
where Nct and Nht are the quantities employed of college equivalents 
(skilled labor) and high school equivalents (unskilled labor) in period t,   
at and bt represent skilled and unskilled labor augmenting technological 
change, αt is a time-varying technology parameter that can be interpreted 
as indexing the share of work activities allocated to skilled labor, and   
ρ is a time invariant production parameter. Skill-neutral technological 
improvements raise at and bt by the same proportion. Skill-biased tech-
nological changes involve increases in at         /bt  or αt. The aggregate elasticity 
of substitution between college and high-school equivalents is given by 
σ = 1/(1 − ρ).
Under the assumption that college and high school equivalents are paid 
their marginal revenue products, we can use equation (1) to solve for the 
ratio of marginal products of the two labor types, yielding a relationship 
between relative wages in year t, wc t       /wht, and relative supplies in year t,   
Nct     /Nht given by
(2) ln(wc t       /wht) = ln[αt    /(1 − αt)] + ρ ln(at         /bt)] − (1/σ)ln(Nct     /Nht),
which can be rewritten as
(3) ln(wc t       /wht) = (1/σ)[Dt − ln(Nct     /Nht)],
where  Dt indexes relative demand shifts favoring college equivalents 
and is measured in log quantity units. The impact of changes in relative 
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aggregate elasticity of substitution between the two skill groups. The 
greater is σ, the smaller the impact of shifts in relative supplies on rela-
tive wages, so the ﬂ  uctuations in demand shifts (Dt) must be greater to 
explain any given time series of relative wages for a given time series 
of relative quantities. Changes in Dt can arise from (disembodied) skill-
biased technological change, non-neutral changes in the relative prices or 
quantities of non-labor inputs, and shifts in product demand.
Following the approach of Katz and Murphy (1992), we directly esti-
mate a version of equation (3) to explain the evolution from 1963 to 
2005 of the overall log college/high school wage differential series for 
full-time, full-year workers from the March CPS shown in Figure 4.5. We 
substitute for the unobserved demand shifts Dt with a simple linear time 
trend. We also include an index of the log relative supply of college/high 
school equivalents: 10
(4) ln(wc t       /wht) = γ0 + γ1t + γ2 ln(Nct     /Nht) + εt,
where γ2 provides an estimate of 1/σ.
Figure 4.6 plots the observed college/high school premium for years 
1963 to 2005 alongside the ﬁ  tted values of equation (4), generated by esti-
mating the Katz-Murphy model for calendar years 1963 through 1987, 
and then extrapolating the estimates through the year 2005 based on 
the observed evolution of college/high school relative supply. The model 
implies a strong, secular growth of college/high school relative demand at 
the rate of about 2.6 log points annually over 1963 to 1987. Though the 
Katz-Murphy model is only ﬁ  t to data through 1987, it does an excellent 
job of forecasting the growth of the college wage premium through 1992, 
thus suggesting that demand shifts favoring college-educated workers 
continued apace in these years. This demand growth is typically inter-
preted as evidence of skill-biased technological change, which refers to 
any introduction of a new technology, change in production methods, or 
change in the organization of work that increases the demand for more-
skilled labor relative to less-skilled labor at ﬁ  xed relative wages. Indeed, 
comprehensive analyses of longer time series by Autor, Katz, and Krueger 
(1998) and Goldin and Katz (2007) suggest that such skill-biased demand 
shifts have been underway for many decades—and that these shifts have 
accelerated in the second half of the twentieth century. 
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What drives these secular demand shifts? A large literature, reviewed 
in Katz and Autor (1999) and Katz (2000), yields two consistent ﬁ  ndings 
that suggest that skill-biased technological change has played an integral 
role.11 The ﬁ  rst ﬁ  nding is that the relative employment of college-edu-
cated workers and non-production workers (that is, professional, man-
agerial, and technical workers rather than line workers) has increased 
rapidly within detailed industries and within business establishments in 
the United States during the 1980s and 1990s, despite the sharp rise in 
the relative wages of these groups (see Dunne, Haltiwanger, and Troske 
1997; Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998). Similar patterns of within-indus-
try increases in the proportion of skilled workers are apparent in other 
advanced nations (Berman, Bound, and Machin 1998; Machin and Van 
Reenen 1998). These ﬁ   ndings suggest strong within-industry demand 
shifts favoring the more skilled, meaning more college-educated, work-
Figure 4.6 
College-High School Wage Differential, 1963–2005: Observed and Predicted
Values
Source: Current Population Survey.
Note: Predicted values are estimated for the years 1963–1987 and 
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ers.12 Second, a wealth of quantitative and case-study evidence documents 
a striking correlation between the adoption of computer-based technolo-
gies (and associated organizational innovations) and the increased use 
of college-educated labor within detailed industries, within ﬁ  rms, and 
across plants within industries (see Doms, Dunne, and Troske 1997; 
Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2002; Levy and Murnane 2004; Bartel, Ich-
niowski, and Shaw 2007). 
While this simple, demand-side explanation is appealing, this story is 
not entirely conﬁ  rmed by the data. The Katz-Murphy model accurately 
predicts the ongoing growth of the college wage premium between 1987 
and 1992, the model substantially overpredicts the growth of the college 
wage premium going forward from 1992. This suggests, unexpectedly, 
that demand shifts favoring college-educated workers have slowed since 
1992.13 This implied slowdown in trend demand growth in the 1990s is 
potentially inconsistent with a simple skill-biased technical change story 
that appeals to the ongoing growth of computer investments, since these 
investments continued rapidly throughout the 1990s, particularly with 
the rapid diffusion of the Internet. Why has this slowdown in demand for 
college-educated workers occurred?
One potential explanation for this implied slowdown is the strong 
cyclical labor market of the expansion of the 1990s, leading to a tight 
labor market that may particularly boost the earnings of workers with 
comparatively lower levels of educational attainment. The weakening of 
some labor market institutions, such as the erosion of the real value of 
the minimum wage since the early 1980s, might also have played a role. 
These hypotheses are evaluated by Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008), 
however, and are found lacking in explanatory power. After accounting 
for the role of supply shifts, the real minimum wage and prime-age male 
unemployment rates provide only modest additional explanatory power 
for the evolution of earnings inequality, and thereby reduce the extent of 
the estimated slowdown in trend demand growth over the last decade.14 
These cyclical and institutional factors are insufﬁ  cient to resolve the puz-
zle posed by slowing trend-relative demand for college-educated workers 
in the 1990s.15 
A closer look at the data suggests why the simple CES model with 
two inputs—college and high school equivalents—fails to provide an 
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adequate explanation of the evolution of between-group wage inequality 
starting in the early 1990s. As shown in Figure 4.4, the real, composi-
tion-adjusted earnings of full-time, full-year workers at different levels 
of educational attainment polarized after 1987 in a manner consistent 
with the divergent trends in 90-50 and 50-10 inequality documented in 
Figure 4.3. In particular, the wage gap between males with a postcollege 
education and those with a high school education rose rapidly and mono-
tonically from 1979 through 2005, increasing by 43.1 log points over-
all and 15.4, 15.7, and 12.0 points, respectively, between 1979–1988, 
1988–1997, and 1997–2005.16 By contrast, after increasing by 13.3 log 
points between 1979 and 1987, the wage gap between males with exactly 
a four-year college degree and those with a high school education rose 
comparatively slowly thereafter, by 4.5 and 9.0 log points, respectively, 
between 1988–1997 and 1997–2005. By implication, between 1988 and 
2005, the earnings of postcollege educated males rose by 14.2 log points 
more than the earnings of males with only a four-year college degree.17 
Conversely, at the bottom of the wage distribution, the wage gap between 
high school graduates and high school dropouts increased steadily from 
1979 and 1997, then ﬂ  attened or reversed.
This pattern, in which wage gaps within college-educated and non-col-
lege-educated workers groups diverge, is inconsistent with the basic, two-
factor CES model. In this model, the labor input of all college-educated 
worker subgroups is assumed to be perfectly substitutable up to a scalar 
multiple, and this substitution holds similarly for non-college-educated 
worker subgroups. Accordingly, the wage ratio of college-educated to 
postcollege-educated worker should be roughly constant, as should be the 
wage ratio of high school dropouts to high school graduates. This two-
factor assumption ﬁ  ts the data rather well from 1963 to 1987. However, 
after 1987 the drastic rise in earnings of postcollege-educated workers 
relative to workers with only a four-year college degree, and the slightly 
increasing earnings of high school dropouts relative to high school gradu-
ates after 1997 represent signiﬁ  cant departures from the model’s assump-
tions. Fundamentally, the two-factor model does not accommodate a 
setting in which the wages of very high and very low-skilled workers rise 
relative to those of middle-educated workers—that is, the model does not 
accommodate a setting in which wage growth polarizes. We consider the How Structural Shifts in Labor Demand Affect Labor Supply Prospects 174
sources of this polarization next, after brieﬂ  y considering the role of the 
minimum wage in greater detail.
IV.  The Elusive Role of the Minimum Wage
In contrast to our conclusions above, several other studies, including Lee 
(1999), Card and DiNardo (2002), and Lemieux (2006b), ﬁ  nd that ﬂ  uc-
tuations in the U.S. minimum wage play a primary role in the rise of 
wage inequality since 1980. The minimum wage explanation for rising 
wage inequality has obvious appeal. As shown by Card and DiNardo 
(2002), there is a striking time series relationship between the real value 
of the federal minimum wage and hourly wage inequality, as measured 
by the 90-10 log earnings ratio. This relationship is depicted in Figure 
4.7. A simple regression of the 90-10 log hourly wage gap from the May/
ORG CPS for the years 1973 to 2005 on the real minimum wage yields 
a coefﬁ  cient of −0.74 and an R-squared of 0.71. Based in part on this 
tight correspondence, Card and DiNardo (2002) and Lemieux (2006b) 
argue that much of the rise in overall and residual inequality over the last 
two decades may be attributed to the minimum wage.18 In a cross state 
analysis of the minimum wage and wage inequality for the period 1979 
to 1991, Lee (1999) reaches a similar conclusion. 
A potential objection to this argument is that the majority of the rise in 
earnings inequality over the last two decades occurred in the upper half 
of the earnings distribution. Since it is not plausible that a declining mini-
mum wage could cause large increases in upper-tail earnings inequality, 
this observation suggests that the minimum wage is unlikely to provide 
a satisfying explanation for the bulk of inequality growth. Not surpris-
ingly, as shown in the upper panel of Figure 4.7, the real minimum wage 
is highly correlated with lower-tail earnings inequality between 1973 and 
2005; a 1 log point rise in the minimum is associated with 0.26 log point 
compression in lower-tail inequality. Somewhat surprisingly, the mini-
mum wage is also highly correlated with upper-tail inequality: a 1 log 
point rise in the minimum is associated with a 0.48 log point compres-
sion in upper-tail inequality; see Figure 4.7, lower panel. 
Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) explore these relationships in greater 
detail by estimating a set of descriptive regressions for hourly earnings 
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inequality among three pairs of income percentiles, 90-10, 90-50, and 
50-10, over the period dating from 1973 to 2005. In addition to the 
minimum wage measure used in Figure 4.7, Autor, Katz, and Kearney 
(2008) augment these models with a linear time trend, a measure of col-
lege/high school relative supply (calculated from the May/ORG CPS), the 
male prime-age unemployment rate (as a measure of labor market tight-
ness), and in some speciﬁ  cations a post-1992 time trend, reﬂ  ecting the 
estimated trend reduction in skill demand in the 1990s. The main ﬁ  nding 
from these models is that the strong relationship between the minimum 
wage and both upper- and lower-tail inequality is highly robust.
These patterns suggest that the time series correlation between mini-
mum wages and income inequality is unlikely to provide causal estimates 
of minimum wage impacts. Indeed, the relationship between the mini-
mum wage and upper-tail inequality is potential evidence of spurious 
causation. Although the decline in the real minimum wage during the 
1980s likely contributed to the expansion of lower-tail inequality—par-
ticularly for women—the robust correlation of the minimum wage with 
upper-tail inequality suggests that other factors are at work.19  One pos-
sibility is that federal minimum wage changes (or lack of changes) during 
these decades were partially a response to political pressures associated 
with changing labor market conditions and the costs a minimum wage 
increase would to impose on employers. This “political economy” story 
could help explain the coincidence of falling minimum wages and rising 
upper-tail inequality.20  
V.  Why Is Labor Demand Polarizing? The Possible Role of Technol-
ogy and Outsourcing
Why, following the monotonic surge of earnings inequality from 1979 
to 1987, did U.S. wage growth polarize, with a strong, persistent rise in 
inequality in the upper half of the distribution, and a slowing, then slight 
reversal of inequality, in the lower-half of the distribution? Based on the 
analysis discussed above, along with further evidence presented in Autor, 
Katz, and Kearney (2008), we conclude that neither standard supply-
demand models nor conventional institutional explanations are sufﬁ  cient 
to explain the evolution of U.S. income inequality since the late 1980s. Figure 4.7
Log Hourly Wage Differentials, 1973–2005: Observed Values and Predicted 
Values from a Regression on the Log Real Federal Minimum Wage
Source: Current Population Survey and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Note: Nominal minimum wages are deflated to real log values using the PCE 
deflator. In panel (a), the real log minimum wage measure is normalized 
to zero in 1973. Subsequent panels depict the observed wage gap (between the 
90th and 10th percentiles, 50th and 10th percentiles, and 90th and 50th 
percentiles) for all hourly workers from the May and Outgoing Rotation Group 
Current Population Survey samples in each year plotted alongside the predicted 
values from separate OLS regressions of the relevant wage gap on a constant 
and the contemporaneous real log minimum wage.
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Figure 4.7 (continued)
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In this section, we focus on one potentially viable hypothesis for the 
polarization of earnings inequality, which focuses on changing demand 
for job tasks, often linked to computerization and, over the longer term, 
outsourcing. As argued by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003, hereafter 
this article is referred to as “ALM”), and ampliﬁ  ed by Goos and Man-
ning (2007); Spitz-Oener (2006); Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006); and 
Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg (2007), the term “skill-biased tech-
nological change” presents an inadequate description of the shifts in 
skill demands that were induced or abetted by the rapid price declines 
in computer technology over the last three decades. In the task frame-
work proposed by ALM, computerization has non-monotone impacts 
on the demand for skills throughout the earnings distribution, sharply 
raising demand for the cognitive and interpersonal skills used by col-
lege-educated professionals and managers (termed “abstract tasks”) and 
reducing demand for clerical and routine analytical and mechanical skills 
that comprised many middle-educated white collar and manufacturing 
production jobs (termed “routine tasks”).21 Somewhat paradoxically, 
computerization has probably had little direct impact on the demand 
for the non-routine manual skills (termed “manual tasks”) used in many 
“low-skilled” service jobs such as health aides, security guards, hospital 
orderlies, janitors, and servers. Because the interpersonal and environ-
mental adaptability demanded by these manual tasks has proven extraor-
dinarily difﬁ  cult to computerize (to date), these manual activities may in 
fact grow in importance as a share of labor input.22 
The ALM framework suggests that computerization, along with 
complementary forces such as international outsourcing, may have 
raised demand for skills among higher-educated workers, depressed skill 
demands for middle-educated workers, and left the lower echelons of the 
wage distribution comparatively unscathed.23 Goos and Manning (2007) 
label this process a “polarization of work,” and argue that it may have 
contributed to a hollowing out of the wage distribution in the United 
Kingdom from 1975 to 2000. Spitz-Oener (2005) and Dustmann, Lud-
steck, and Schönberg (2007) report a similar polarization of employment 
for the former West Germany during the 1979 to 1999 period.24
To illustrate the relevance of shifts in task demands for changes in 
skill demands, we link data on task intensity by occupation (information 
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taken from the U.S. Department of Labor’s online Dictionary of Occupa-
tional Titles) to data on skill level by occupation contained in the 1980 
Census. In this analysis, occupational skill level is measured by the mean 
years of education of an occupation’s workforce (weighting workers by 
their annual hours worked). Figure 4.8 uses a locally weighted smooth-
ing regression to plot task intensity by occupational skill for each of the 
three broad task categories above: abstract, routine, and manual tasks.25 
Task intensities are measured as percentiles of the baseline distribution 
of job tasks in 1960. Thus, an occupation with the median intensity of 
“routine” task input in 1960 would receive a score of 50. This ﬁ  gure 
shows that the intensity of abstract skill input is monotonically rising in 
occupational skill level (reﬂ  ecting more education) and, conversely, the 
intensity of manual task input is falling in occupational skill level. Most 
Figure 4.8 
Task Intensity by Occupational Skill Percentile, Defined as Occupation’s
Rank (in Percentiles) in Mean Years of Education
Source: Dictionary of Occupational Titles and U.S. Census Bureau.
Note: Percentiles of the 1960 task distribution are determined using 
occupational task inputs defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.
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signiﬁ   cantly, there is a distinctly non-monotone relationship between 
occupational skill and routine task input. Routine task use is highest 
between the 20th and 60th percentiles of the skill distribution, and falls 
off sharply on either side of this range. This non-monotonic relationship 
is highly relevant because, as documented by ALM, routine task input 
saw the sharpest decline of all task categories over the last two decades 
(relative to its initial 1960 level). The substitution of information tech-
nology for routine tasks might be expected to contribute to polarization 
by reducing demand for middle-skill occupations relative to either high- 
or low-skill occupations. 
An implication of the polarization hypothesis is that the twisting of the 
wage structure observed in recent years is, at least in part, a demand-side 
phenomenon, induced by rising relative demands for both high- and low-
skill tasks. This implication is testable, and we provide a simple evaluation 
here. Following analysis for the United Kingdom in Goos and Manning 
(2007), we use U.S. Census data to explore how employment growth by 
occupation over the last two decades is related to occupational skill, as 
proxied by educational levels.26 Our hypothesis is that, if the wage struc-
ture changes observed in the 1980s and 1990s are driven in substantial 
part by demand shifts, wage changes by earnings level and employment 
changes by skill level should positively covary in both decades.
To test this implication, in the upper panel of Figure 4.9 we plot the 
change in the share of total hours worked in the economy from 1980–
1990 and 1990–2000 by occupation skill percentile, using the educa-
tion-based occupational skill measure developed earlier.27 For the decade 
of the 1980s, we see substantial declines in employment shares at the 
bottom end of the skill distribution, and observe strongly monotonic 
increases in employment shares as we move up the skill distribution. In 
contrast, employment growth in the 1990s appears to have polarized. 
There is rapid employment growth in highest-skill jobs (at or above the 
75th percentile), a decline in the employment shares of middle-skill jobs 
(those at percentiles between 30 to 75), and ﬂ  at or rising employment 
shares in the lowest-skill jobs, those in deciles one through three. 
This pattern of job growth corresponds closely with the observed pat-
tern of wage structure changes in each decade, as is shown in the lower 
panel of Figure 4.9. Real wage growth was essentially monotone in terms 
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of wage percentiles in the 1980s, with especially sharp wage growth 
above the 75th percentile and especially sharp declines below the 30th 
percentile. In the decade of the 1990s, however, wage growth was more 
U-shaped. Wage growth was stronger below the 30th percentile, and 
especially above the 80th percentile of the distribution, than throughout 
the remainder of the distribution. Thus, despite substantial differences in 
the evolution of inequality between the 1980s and 1990s, labor market 
prices and quantities (as measured by wage and skill percentiles) appear 
to positively covary in each decade. 
To provide a slightly more rigorous assessment of this observation, we 
estimate a set of  ordinary-least-square models of the form,
(5)  ΔEpτ = ατ + βτΔlnWpτ + εpτ        ,
where changes in log employment share by skill percentile are regressed 
on changes in log wages by wage percentile in each decade. Here, ΔEpτ 
represents the change in occupational log employment share at skill per-
centile p in decade τ, and ΔlnWpτ is the change in real log hourly earnings 
at the corresponding wage percentile in the same decade.28 Using data for 
the 4th through 97th percentiles of the earnings and skill distributions 
(thus trimming outliers at the tails), we estimate that βτ = 300 (t = 3.75) 
for the 1980s, and that βτ = 2.96 (t = 1.90) for the 1990s. Thus, both the 
monotone rise of wage inequality in the 1980s and the polarized growth 
of wage inequality in the 1990s are mirrored by conformal changes in 
employment by skill. This ﬁ  nding is consistent with a demand-side expla-
nation for observed wage changes.29
We have further experimented with these simple models by including 
linear terms in wage percentiles in addition to (or instead) of estimated 
wage changes by percentile. For the decade of the 1980s, we ﬁ  nd that 
a linear function of wage percentiles ﬁ  ts the observed pattern of skilled 
employment growth better than does the observed change in earnings by 
percentile. In the 1990s, by contrast, the linear term is insigniﬁ  cant, and 
the estimate of β90–00 is hardly affected by its inclusion (either in mag-
nitude or precision). These simple models do not, of course, take into 
account the substitutability and complementarity among various skill 
groups, as measured by skill percentiles, and so lack a well-grounded 
production function interpretation. We nevertheless view these models 
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as suggestive evidence that labor demand shifts have favored low- and 
high-wage workers relative to middle-wage workers over the last ﬁ  fteen 
years—a pattern that stands in contrast to the shifts in labor demand dur-
ing the 1980s, which appear to have been monotonically rising in skill.
VI.  The Jobs of the Future: Both “Lousy and Lovely” Jobs
There is no controversy to the contention that highly-educated profes-
sional and managerial jobs, meaning those jobs using abstract skills, 
will continue growing rapidly. Perhaps less recognized is the corollary 
implication to this proposition: that jobs demanding “non-routine man-
ual” skills, meaning those skills not readily automated, and hence jobs 
requiring only low-levels of educational attainment, are likely to expand 
as well. In the memorable phrase used in Goos and Manning (2007) to 
describe the polarization of employment they found in the United King-
dom, we seem to be confronting a future labor market in which jobs are 
either “lovely” or “lousy.” To provide some direct evidence on the rel-
evance of this hypothesis, we look at the changing occupational structure 
of employment in the United States. 
Table 4.1 shows the educational level and employment shares in six 
major occupational groups covering all U.S. employment categories: 1) 
managerial and professional specialties; 2) technicians, sales, and admin-
istrative support; 3) precision production, craft, and repair; 4) service 
occupations; 5) operators, fabricators, and laborers; and 6) farming, 
ﬁ  shing, and forestry occupations. The category in which workers have 
the highest average educational level is managerial and professional spe-
cialty occupations, followed, at some distance, by technicians, sales, and 
administrative support. The four remaining categories—each averaging 
half the size of the ﬁ  rst two—are demonstrably less education-intensive 
Whereas in the year 2000, high school dropouts made up 2.2 percent of 
employment in professional/managerial jobs and 6.7 of employment in 
technical, sales and administrative support jobs, they comprised 20-plus 
percent of employment in the four remaining categories.
As discussed by Autor and Dorn (2007), employment growth has not 
been uniform across these six categories. Figure 4.10 shows that mana-
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egory—experienced consistent, rapid growth between 1980 and 2005, 
gaining 7.1 percentage points as a share of overall employment between 
1980 and 2005, a 30 percent increase. By contrast, employment in the 
middle skill group of technical, sales and administrative support occupa-
tions showed an inverse U-shape pattern over this period, expanding in 
the 1980s and then contracting to below its initial 1980 level over the 
next 15 years; this is consistent with the growing substitution of technol-
ogy for completing routine tasks. Most strikingly, employment shares 
in three of the four low-skill occupations fell sharply in each decade. 
Between 1980 and 2005, farming, forestry, and ﬁ  shery occupations con-
tracted by more than 50 percent as a share of employment, while the 
category comprised of operators, fabricators, and laborers contracted by 
33 percent, and precision production, craft, and repair occupations con-
tracted by 19 percent. 
Standing in sharp contrast to these patterns of declining employment, 
however, is the experience of service occupations.  Despite being among 
the least educated and lowest paid occupations in the U.S. economy, 
employment in service occupations expanded in each decade between 
1980 and 2005, rising from 11.0 percent of employment in 1980 to 11.8 
percent in 1990, to 13.7 percent in 2000 and to 14.9 percent in 2005. 
This 35 percent increase is 6 percentage points larger than the gain in 
employment shares of managerial and professional occupations during 
the same period. 
What is unique about service jobs? Table 4.2 lists the major service 
occupations, the largest of which are: food preparation and service; 
health service support (a group that excludes registered nurses and other 
skilled medical personnel); and buildings and grounds cleaning and main-
tenance.30 These are low-paying jobs; in the year 2000, 73 percent had 
hourly wages below the overall hourly median. From the perspective of 
our conceptual framework, what distinguishes these service occupations 
is that each is highly intensive in “non-routine manual” tasks—activities 
requiring interpersonal and environmental adaptability yet little in the 
way of formal education. These are precisely the job tasks that are difﬁ  -
cult to automate with current technology because these jobs are non-rou-
tine and difﬁ  cult to outsource because, in large part, the tasks involved 
must be produced and performed in-person in real time. 
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Employment projections from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
Employment Outlook conﬁ   rm the view that low-skilled services are 
likely to be a major contributor to U.S. employment growth going for-
ward. The BLS forecasts that employment in service occupations will 
increase by 5.3 million, or 19 percent, between 2004 and 2014.31 The 
only major occupational category with greater projected growth during 
this time period is professional occupations, which are predicted to add 6 
million jobs, a 21.2 percent increase.32 Like all forecasts, these should be 
treated as tentative. Historically, the BLS has underpredicted the growing 
demand for professional and managerial occupations (see Bishop and 
Carter 1991; Freeman 2006). 
It is likely that the rapid growth of service employment in the United 
States has multiple causes. One is the direct substitution of computer-
ization for routine tasks, which causes the share of labor input devoted 
to non-routine activities to increase.33 A second force, though of highly 
uncertain magnitude, is international outsourcing, which complements 
computerization in permitting routine tasks previously performed by 
domestic workers to be sourced to other locations.34 
But these technological forces are not the only drivers of this increased 
demand. The aging of the U.S. population contributes to the growth of 
health services support occupations—and this contribution will become 
more important going forward. Supply-side factors may also be impor-
tant. Recent work by Cortes (2006) demonstrates that inﬂ  uxes of low-
skilled immigrants into major American cities causes the market prices of 
non-traded, low-skill intensive services to fall and consumption of these 
services to rise. Thus, the rapid growth of service employment is also 
partly attributable to U.S. immigration policy. 
A ﬁ   nal, relatively unstudied, factor potentially contributing to the 
growth of service employment is the rise of income inequality itself. 
Household consumption of services appears to be highly income elastic 
(Mazzolari and Ragusa 2007). This makes it plausible that the strong, 
secular rise in the earnings share of high-income households over almost 
three decades has increased ﬁ  nal demand for services (see Piketty and 
Saez 2003; Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008). Preliminary evidence sup-
porting this hypothesis is offered by Autor and Dorn (2007) and Mazzo-
lari and Ragusa (2007), who ﬁ  nd that service employment growth in the 
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United States has been greatest in the metropolitan areas where income 
inequality has increased the most. Given that the rise of high incomes 
shows no signs of abating, this force may stimulate additional demand 
for low-education, in-person services. 
VII.  Possible Labor Supply Responses: Human Capital Policy and 
Immigration Policy
Proceeding on the view that U.S. employment growth will be concen-
trated at the tails—in other words, in occupations requiring either high 
or low levels of education—how might labor supply respond? Because 
other papers in this volume treat this question in great detail, I offer only 
brief remarks on this issue, focusing on topics where policy is likely to 
have particular leverage.35
A ﬁ  rst point of paramount economic importance is that the returns 
to human capital investments are currently extremely high. While some 
research has highlighted the fact that the college wage differential pla-
teaued in the early 1990s, this observation needs to be placed in appro-
priate context. Even in the late 1990s, the college wage differential stood 
at a near-historic level (see Goldin and Katz 2007). And, as indicated by 
Figure 4.4, there was a further pickup in the pure college/high school 
premium after 1999. Moreover, the wage differential associated with 
postcollege educational returns has risen rapidly and near-continuously 
from 1980 to the present. Thus, postsecondary education appears to be 
an excellent investment. 
Responding to this price signal, college enrollment of U.S. youth has 
risen considerably since the premium to earning a four-year college degree 
began its historic rise in the early 1980s. After falling slightly between 
1970 and 1980, the fraction of 20 to 24 year-olds enrolled in post-second-
ary education rose from 35.9 percent in 1980, to 42.7 percent in 1990, to 
44.7 percent in 2000, and 49.3 in 2005 (U.S. Department of Education 
2007). College completion rates have not risen commensurately, how-
ever. Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner (2007) report that from 1970 for-
ward, the share of youth obtaining the equivalent of a four-year college 
degree by age 23 rose only slightly for cohorts completing high school.36 
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10 percent, and the share completing a degree within four years (among 
degree completers) fell by 20 percent. Although some increase in the col-
lege non-completion rate is to be expected as the fraction of students 
enrolling in college rises, these statistics suggest that there may be room 
to improve the outcomes of these initial investments in a college edu-
cation. Indeed, despite having led the world in high school and college 
completion for most of the twentieth century, U.S. young adults are now 
in the middle of the pack in the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) in terms of educational attainment (see 
OECD 2006; Goldin and Katz 2007).
There is ongoing debate about the degree to which ﬁ  nancial constraints 
hinder college matriculation among U.S. youth. There is little doubt, how-
ever, that the gap in college attendance rates when gauged by parental 
income, race, and ethnicity remain large and may have potentially wid-
ened over the last 25 years (see Ellwood and Kane 2000; Heckman and 
Carneiro 2002).37 Considerable evidence shows that reductions in col-
lege costs (due to tuition reductions or ﬁ  nancial aid) greatly increase col-
lege attendance for youths from moderate income families (see Dynarski 
2002; Kane 1999) and even affect the postcollege occupational choices 
of graduates of elite universities (see Rothstein and Rouse 2007). It is 
therefore abundantly clear that college costs have a substantial impact 
on the college-going decisions and career choices of young adults. More-
over, the economic returns to college attendance for youth from mod-
erate income families appear to be at least as large as those for more 
advantaged attendees (Card 2001). Thus, there appears a solid case for 
reducing the ﬁ  nancial barriers to college attendance for students from 
low and moderate income U.S. families. 
As has been stressed by many researchers, generous college ﬁ  nancing 
is not sufﬁ  cient for college success. Students who do not receive ade-
quate human capital investments early in life may gain less from later 
educational investments (see Heckman and Lochner 2000). Most evi-
dence suggests large returns from early childhood educational interven-
tions (see Currie 2001; Anderson 2007). Thus, efforts to improve college 
attainment among U.S. students need to commence well before students 
approach college-going age.38 
In addition to fostering college attendance by U.S. residents, a critical 
policy lever for increasing the supply of highly educated workers for the 
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American workforce is attracting skilled students of all nationalities to 
U.S. colleges and universities. In 2003, 573,000 foreign students were 
enrolled in U.S. institutions of higher education, an 84 percent increase 
from the 1980 level (U.S. Department of Education 2005, Table 408). 
While these numbers appear sizable, the share of foreign students attend-
ing U.S. higher educational institutions is small: 2.6 percent in 1980 and 
3.4 percent in 2003.39 Foreign student enrollment brings many of the 
world’s most talented individuals to the United States. A substantial frac-
tion of these students will ultimately remain in the United States and 
contribute to U.S. invention and economic growth. To the extent that 
foreign students return to their home countries following their stud-
ies, one suspects that many will maintain positive economic—as well 
as political and cultural—interactions with the United States. Thus, 
the United States maximizes the return on its leadership role in higher 
education by producing talent and by attracting it from all parts of the 
world. 
Foreign students enrolled in American universities are heavily concen-
trated in graduate- and doctoral-level study, particularly in science, tech-
nology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). In the year 2000, foreign 
students received between 25 and 55 percent of all doctorates awarded 
by U.S. universities in the key STEM ﬁ  elds of electrical engineering, phys-
ics, chemistry and biology. The growth of foreign students enrolled in 
U.S. graduate degree programs has raised concerns that the wages of 
native-born Americans are adversely impacted by the inﬂ  ux of foreign 
students (see Borjas 2006). Though this is an economically sound argu-
ment, this concern strikes me as somewhat misplaced given the high and 
rising earnings of highly-educated workers in the United States—particu-
larly those with graduate degrees. If the relatively abundant supply of 
foreign students to STEM ﬁ  elds serves to buffer the ongoing growth of 
wage inequality in the upper half of the U.S. earnings distribution, this 
may arguably be viewed as an additional beneﬁ  t. U.S. inequality would 
almost surely be higher and rising more rapidly at the top if we had to 
rely more heavily on home-grown talent. 
Closely related to the enrollment of foreign students into U.S. universi-
ties is the entry of skilled migrants into the U.S. labor force. Though the 
United States has many of the world’s leading universities, the majority of 
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States. Freeman (2006) estimates that the U.S. fraction of Ph.D.s trained 
relative to total world output will have fallen from about 50 percent in 
the early 1970s to a projected level of 15 percent in 2010. The grow-
ing cadre of highly-educated workers produced outside the United States 
provides one mechanism for addressing potential skill shortages. As Free-
man (2006, p. 10) observes: 
During the 1990s’ rapid growth of the U.S. economy, the country greatly 
increased its employment of scientists and engineers. It did so despite fairly con-
stant numbers of graduates in these ﬁ  elds among citizens or permanent residents 
and without markedly raising the salaries of these workers… The United States 
was able to meet increased demands for scientists and engineers without huge 
increases in salaries by “importing” foreign born specialists in these areas. Some 
of the foreign born obtained their education in the United States and remained to 
work in the country. But most of those with B.S. degrees and roughly half of those 
with higher degrees graduated overseas and came to ﬁ  ll jobs. If the U.S. economy 
demands more highly skilled workers in the period of projected slow labor force 
growth, it should be able to increase supplies by admitting more immigrants in 
areas with rising labor demand, as it did in the 1990s.
This example underscores that, should the United States ultimately face 
a skill shortage as the baby boom generation retires, this shortage will be 
a consequence of political choice as a much as demographic destiny. So 
long as the United States is perceived by educated citizens worldwide as 
a land of abundant opportunity, it will be able to attract foreign talent to 
meet domestic labor demand. 
In recent years, U.S. immigration policy has been responsive to these 
demands. The H1-B Visa Program allows U.S. employers to tempo-
rarily hire skilled foreigners who have the educational equivalent of a 
U.S. bachelor’s degree. Prior to the mid-1990s, the H1-B quota stood at 
65,000 visas per year. During the “dot-com” boom, Congress increased 
the quota to 115,000 in 1998 and then again to 195,000 in the year 
2000. The quota dropped back to 90,000 in 2004, however, and is cur-
rently coming under economic pressure. The entire quota of H1-B visas 
for ﬁ  scal year 2007 was exhausted within a span of less than two months. 
It remains to be seen whether the cap will be lifted again soon. 
Over the longer term, it appears possible (though highly uncertain) 
that the United States will move to a skills-based immigration system. 
The Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform 
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Act, which was hotly debated though ultimately rejected by Congress in 
2007, would have prioritized access to U.S. visa applicants according to 
their educational levels, family ties, age, English language proﬁ  ciency, and 
applicants’ occupations. Of special note, priority would have been given 
to workers in “in-demand” occupations. While the virtues and draw-
backs of such a system are too complex to adequately address here, two 
points deserve note. First, the notion of weighting applicants’ skills in visa 
allocation decisions has merit. Second, accurately forecasting what skills 
and occupations will be “in demand” is generally not something gov-
ernment statistical agencies are able to predict with high reliability (see 
Freeman 2006). In the existing H1-B Visa Program, by contrast, employ-
ers identify and sponsor individual visa candidates. While this process 
is time- and resource-intensive, it does give employers a strong incen-
tive to sponsor workers who possess particularly valuable skills. Thus, 
there may be efﬁ  ciencies in this highly ﬁ  rm-level determination process. 
Commenting on the immigration reform act current before Congress 
in 2007, Lowell Sachs of Sun Microsystems opines (quoted in Broache 
2007):
The best the government can hope to do is select a pool of generically potentially 
qualiﬁ  ed candidates, whereas a company knowing exactly what it needs, exactly 
what skills and exactly what kind of individual can best deliver is going to be far 
better able to make the right match… What happens if I’m interested in ﬁ  nding 
a brain surgeon and I’ve got a bunch of people to pick from, a pediatrician over 
here, a podiatrist over here, but no brain surgeon?
As this quotation highlights, it is not clear that the U.S. Congress is a 
better judge of the skill needs of the U.S. economy than are the U.S. 
employers who, under the H1-B program, hand-select individual foreign 
workers to meet speciﬁ  c skill needs. 
VIII.  Job Quality in the Services Occupations
There is, in my view, a solid case for meeting rising demand for pro-
fessional and technical occupations, in part by importing postsecondary 
students and highly-trained foreign workers. The same arguments are 
less persuasive when applied to the demand for low-educated, in-per-
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wages of high school graduates and dropouts—those most likely to per-
form service jobs—have fared poorly over the last three decades. Autor, 
Katz, and Kearney (2008) estimate that real wage growth for workers 
with high school diplomas and lower educational attainment levels was 
negative between 1979 and 1995, and only modestly positive from 1995 
to 2005. Facilitating increased immigration of competing worker groups 
appears unlikely to improve this situation.40 Moreover, while a case can 
be made that high-skilled workers generate positive human capital exter-
nalities—thus making high-skilled immigration a “public good” (see 
Moretti 2004a and 2004b)—this argument does not apply to low-skilled 
immigrants.41 Finally, it is often argued that if the United States does 
not import high-skilled labor, high-skilled jobs will follow the workers 
to where they reside. This argument clearly is not relevant for low-skill, 
in-person services, since the provision of these services is primarily non-
tradable. In sum, rising U.S. demand for low-skilled services does not 
represent an economic problem that demands a policy solution. Indeed, 
a signiﬁ  cant beneﬁ  t of such an upward demand shift is that it is likely to 
increase the earnings of less-educated workers.42
Even given rising demand for service sector jobs, labor supply to ser-
vices occupations, however, may be sufﬁ  ciently elastic that wages stay 
low. Median real hourly wages in service jobs were $8.99 in 1980, $8.76 
in 1990, and $9.40 in 2000. These hourly wage rates imply annual, full-
time earnings of under $20,000 per year; but of course, many service jobs 
do not provide full-time, full-year earnings.43 This income level readily 
exceeds the poverty threshold for the year 2000 of $17,500 for a fam-
ily comprised of two adults and two dependent children. Yet $20,000 
is probably an inadequate income for families to make optimal invest-
ments in childrearing and education. Echoing the concerns above regard-
ing college attainment and early life preparedness, it appears a legitimate 
concern that the ongoing polarization of earnings levels among U.S. 
households will ultimately serve to thwart economic mobility among 
subsequent generations. While the impact of current economic inequality 
on future mobility cannot be judged until decades after the die is cast, 
it is clear from the current vantage point that a substantial reduction in 
mobility would be inimical to the U.S. ideal of meritocracy and equal 
opportunity. 44 Accordingly, policies that ensure access to excellent educa-
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tion and healthcare for all U.S. families serve in part as a precautionary 
investment for maintaining economic mobility in the next generation. 
There are two primary means to improve the economic conditions of 
workers in low-skilled service jobs. One way is through transfers and 
other social supports. For example, the Earned Income Tax Credit has 
substantially raised labor force participation and earnings of single moth-
ers (see Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001). Programs such as Medicare, Head 
Start, and the federal Pell grant program provide health insurance, support 
early childhood educational investments, and reduce the cost of postsec-
ondary education for low-income households. Such programs could be 
expanded and improved to provide additional assistance to childrearing 
families. A signiﬁ  cant downside risk to such social policies, however, is 
that these programs are vulnerable to the vicissitudes of budgetary pres-
sures and political sentiments.45 Transfer programs that do not create a 
broad constituency of middle- and upper-income beneﬁ  ciaries are, over 
the long run, probably less likely to survive. 
An alternative means to improve economic conditions of workers 
in low-skilled service jobs is to “professionalize” these occupations to 
provide better services and thus command higher wages. Occupational 
standards and licensing are one means to accomplish this objective. 
Labor unions are another. The evidence on the efﬁ  ciency of such steps 
is decidedly mixed. Kleiner’s comprehensive 2005 study of occupational 
licensing in the United States concludes that professional licensing has 
primarily served to restrict competition without improving the quality 
of the services provided. DiNardo and Lee (2004) ﬁ  nd that new private 
sector labor unions certiﬁ  ed in the 1980s and 1990s have had little eco-
nomic impact—positive or negative—on the earnings of newly unionized 
employees or on the proﬁ  tability of newly unionized ﬁ  rms. Thus, despite 
the intellectual appeal of improving wages and performance quality in 
service occupations, the speciﬁ  c steps to accomplish this objective are not 
immediately evident, at least to me. 
IX.  International Outsourcing: A Force of Unknown Magnitude
More than any issue discussed above, there is vast uncertainty about the 
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domestic labor demand in the United States. At present, most quanti-
tative assessments of the potential impacts of outsourcing are highly 
preliminary or impressionistic (see Kletzer 2006; Blinder 2007).46 The-
oretical work has also produced somewhat mixed projections on pos-
sible labor demand impacts (see Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg 
2006a and 2006b; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, forthcoming). In my 
assessment, a safe conclusion is that outsourcing will increase the returns 
to “knowledge work,” both by raising demand for scarce managerial 
and problem-solving talent, and by increasing the returns on intellectual 
property developed in advanced economies. Outsourcing will not directly 
substitute for performing in-person services. Moreover, the income gains 
accruing to the highly skilled might stimulate additional demand for such 
lower-level services occupations. Beyond this conjecture, there is little 
predictive certainty. The possibility appears remote that outsourcing will 
ultimately displace as large a share of domestic white collar work as inter-
national trade and technological change did to decrease domestic demand 
for blue collar manufacturing work. But then again, the possibility that 
manufacturing would ultimately employ less than 15 percent of the U.S. 
workforce in 2000, even while 42 percent of U.S. consumer spending 
was devoted to purchasing goods, must also have seemed remote several 
decades earlier (U.S. Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce 2004). 
The profound uncertainty about the potential for the international out-
sourcing of jobs to affect domestic labor demand should stimulate much 
additional research on this topic. A key factor hindering research has 
been lack of measurement. Unlike trade in goods, trade in labor services 
is at an extremely primitive stage of measurement. A ﬁ  rst priority for 
U.S. statistical agencies should be extensive data collection to assess the 
extent of international outsourcing and to document the nature of tasks 
currently being outsourced. Yet trade in services will always be more dif-
ﬁ  cult to capture and quantify than trade in goods. Just as productivity 
measurement has become more uncertain as U.S. economic activity has 
moved from a concentration on manufacturing to services, tracking trade 
ﬂ  ows will become increasingly challenging as trade in services takes its 
place alongside trade in goods as an increasingly important source of U.S. 
economic activity. 
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X. Conclusion
Viewed from the perspective of the 1980s, the rapid, monotone rise of 
wage inequality appeared to presage an era of ever-increasing demand 
for skills, with rising incomes for the highly-educated workers and fall-
ing incomes for everyone else. Fortunately, this vision has not yet come 
to pass. The secular demand increases favoring more educated work-
ers appear to have been less rapid in the 1990s and early 2000s than 
from the 1960s to the 1980s. Overall wage inequality continued grow-
ing from 1990 to 2005, but at a slower pace than in the 1980s. Rather 
than spreading continuously, wage growth polarized after 1987, with 
persistent increases in inequality in the upper half of the income distri-
bution and slow or reversing inequality trends in the lower-half of the 
distribution. 
Demand-side forces have played a key role in shaping structural 
changes in U.S. wages during the inequality surge of the 1980s, and the 
polarization that followed. In the 1980s, during which wage growth was 
essentially monotone in terms of skills, employment shares in the high-
est-educated and highest-paid occupations expanded substantially, while 
employment shares in the lowest-skill occupations contracted. During 
the subsequent decade—in which earnings growth polarized—employ-
ment shares in very low- and very high-skill occupations increased,  while 
employment shares in moderately skilled occupations contracted. The 
roughly parallel movement of earnings and employment growth in each 
decade suggests that demand-side forces have been central to these pat-
terns of wage changes. 
Following Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and Goos and Manning 
(2007), we argue that these patterns may in part be explained by a richer 
version of the skill-biased technical change hypothesis, which posits that 
information technology complements highly educated workers engaged 
in abstract tasks, substitutes for moderately educated workers perform-
ing routine tasks, and has less impact on low-skilled workers perform-
ing manual tasks. Extrapolating from these trends, we forecast (perhaps 
unwisely) an ongoing growth of demand for both professional and 
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low-skilled in-person service jobs—tasks that are difﬁ  cult to either auto-
mate or outsource, but do not require more than a high school educa-
tion. 
Given slowing U.S. population growth and decelerating rates of educa-
tional attainment, it is natural for the United States to look to developing 
and developed countries as a source of supply for future employment 
growth. In the case of highly educated workers, we view such efforts as 
sound. Attracting skilled residents to the United States, either as students 
or workers, is likely to raise wealth and improve the quality of life for a 
large number of U.S. residents. As a secondary beneﬁ  t, increased skilled 
migration to the United States may temper the ongoing rise of upper-
tail earnings inequality. These same arguments appear less compelling 
when applied to the immigration of low-skilled workers. Wages of low-
skilled U.S. workers have been stagnant for most of the past 30 years. If 
labor demand is indeed rising for low-skilled, in-person services occupa-
tions, this may give a long overdue boost to earnings for these groups—a 
welcome development for economic mobility and social cohesion in the 
United States. 
Though it seems banal to end a research summary with a call for fur-
ther research, this bromide seems less self-serving than usual in the current 
context. Due to rapid economic development in Asia and improvements 
in computer and communications technology, international trade and 
outsourcing appear poised to become important determinants of U.S. 
domestic labor demand. Yet we have little knowledge of the scope, mag-
nitude, speed, or even direction with which these forces will impact skill 
demands and earnings distributions in the United States and in other 
advanced economies. Devising innovative and rigorous means to mea-
sure and evaluate the impacts of these evolving forces of globalization on 
inequality and economic well-being constitutes a signiﬁ  cant agenda item 
for further research in this ﬁ  eld.
 I am grateful to Jared Bernstein and Gary Burtless for insightful com-
ments and suggestions. I am intellectually indebted to coauthors David 
Dorn, Lawrence Katz, Melissa Kearney, Alan Krueger, Frank Levy, and 
Richard Murnane for the main themes and conclusions of this paper.  
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Notes
1. This observation was, to my knowledge, ﬁ  rst offered by Mishel, Bernstein, 
and Boushey (2002). 
2. The Current Population Survey and Census of Populations data analyzed 
here do not cover the top several percentiles of the earnings distribution where 
the most dramatic increases in real earnings have occurred during the last three 
decades (see Piketty and Saez 2003). Including these top percentiles would, con-
sistent with our discussion, reveal even greater growth at the top throughout the 
years studied, but this inclusion would not qualitatively change our conclusions 
about income inequality. 
3. It bears note, however, that all percentiles of the distribution fared better in 
the second half of the time period (1989 through 2005) than in the ﬁ  rst half 
(1973 through 1989), reﬂ  ecting the considerable acceleration of U.S. productivity 
growth from the mid-1990s forward.  
4. These series are smoothed using three-year moving averages. Thus, the data 
point labeled 2004 is the average of the values for 2003, 2004, and 2005. 
5. I use the term “we” throughout the paper because the material in this paper 
draws heavily on work I performed jointly with David Dorn, Frank Levy, Law-
rence Katz, Melissa Kearney, Alan Krueger, and Richard Murnane. 
6.  Details of the samples and data processing methods used for these data series 
are provided in Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008). 
7. We do not discuss inequality of earnings residuals (that is, the unexplained 
component of wage variance). For recent work on this topic, see Lemieux (2006b) 
and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005 and 2008). 
8. For this ﬁ  gure, we use the full time period of 1963 to 2005 (in contrast to 
Figures 4.1 through 4.3) because reliable measures of average earnings levels 
extending back to 1963 are available from the March Current Population Survey. 
By contrast, trends in earnings distribution (such as the 90/50 and 50/10) are 
more precisely measured using the CPS May/ORG data (Lemieux 2006b), which 
only extend back to 1973. 
9.  For previous implementations of such a model, see Katz and Murphy (1992); 
Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998); Katz and Autor (1999); Card and Lemieux 
(2001); and Acemoglu (2002), among others. 
10. We use a standard measure of college/non-college relative supply calculated 
in “efﬁ  ciency units” to adjust for changes in labor force composition by gender 
and experience groups. 
11. Skill-biased technological change refers to any introduction of a new tech-
nology, change in production methods, or change in the organization of work 
that increases the demand for more-skilled labor relative to less-skilled labor at 
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12. Foreign outsourcing of less-skilled jobs is another possible explanation for 
this pattern (Feenstra and Hanson 1999). But large within-industry shifts toward 
more skilled workers are pervasive even in sectors with little or no observed for-
eign outsourcing activity. Foreign outsourcing appears likely to become increas-
ingly important, however.
13.  Less restrictive variants of this model estimated in Autor, Katz, and Kearney 
(2008) also imply that trend demand growth for college relative to non-college 
workers slowed in the early 1990s. Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) and Card 
and DiNardo (2002) reach a similar conclusion. 
14. In contrast to the ﬁ  ndings of Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008), analyses by 
Bartik (2001) and Bernstein and Baker (2003) ﬁ  nd that a low unemployment rate 
differentially raises earnings in low relative to high wage deciles, thus compress-
ing wage inequality. While a resolution of these conﬂ  icting conclusions is beyond 
the scope of this paper, this issue merits further study. 
15. The direct effects of union decline on U.S. wage inequality growth also 
appear to be modest. Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2003) ﬁ  nd that falling union-
ization explains about 14 percent of the growth of male wage variance from 1973 
to 2001 (in models allowing for skill group differences in the impact of unions), 
with an even smaller union effect for the growth of female wage variance.
16. For females, earnings growth between 1988 and 2005 among postcollege-
educated workers was substantially greater than for college-only-educated work-
ers, but the pattern was reversed for the 1979–1988 period. 
17. Lemieux (2006a) documents the rapid, ongoing rise in the wage return to 
college and postcollege education. He estimates that more than two-thirds of 
the rise in wage inequality between 1973 and 2005 is explained by the growing 
return to postsecondary education. 
18. Lemieux (2006b) focuses on the tight ﬁ  t between the real minimum wage 
and residual wage variance for men and women from 1973 to 2003. We also 
ﬁ  nd greater time series explanatory power of the real minimum wage for residual 
wage inequality measures than for actual wage inequality measures. This is puz-
zling for the minimum wage hypothesis, since the minimum wage should “bite” 
more for actual low wage workers than for residual low wage workers.
19. Lee (1999) also noted a puzzling relationship between the “effective” state 
minimum wage (the log difference between the state median and the state minimum) 
and upper-tail inequality. Opposite to the simple time-series regressions above, Lee 
ﬁ  nds in a cross-state analysis that increases in the effective state minimum wage 
appear to reduce upper-tail inequality, both for males and for the pooled-gender 
distribution. This result led him to advise caution in causally attributing trends in 
male and pooled-gender earnings inequality to the minimum wage.
20. In a similar vein, Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante (2001) argue that the 
decline in union penetration in the United States and the United Kingdom is 
partly explained by changing skill demands that reduced the viability of rent-
sharing bargains between high and low skill workers. Furthermore, the direct 
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effects of union decline on U.S. wage inequality growth appear to be modest. 
Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2003) ﬁ  nd that falling unionization explains about 
14 percent of the growth of male wage variance from 1973 to 2001 (in models 
allowing for skill group differences in the impact of unions), with an even smaller 
union effect for the growth of female wage variance.
21.  A related earlier model along these lines is developed in Juhn (1994). 
22.  See Levy and Murnane (2004) for numerous paradigmatic examples. The fact 
that computerization causes manual tasks to grow as a share of labor input may 
be understood as a form of Baumol’s disease—that is, the tendency for advanced 
economies to devote an ever-rising share of resources to labor-intensive sectors 
characterized by slow productivity growth, such as education and health care, 
while sectors with rapid productivity growth (such as manufacturing or farming) 
ultimately require fewer resources to meet consumer demand. 
23. Welch (2000) and Weinberg (2000) argue that these technical changes are 
particularly likely to have been favorable to demand for female labor.
24. Acemoglu (1999) offers an alternative theory of job polarization based on 
endogenous changes in production techniques as a response to a rise in the avail-
ability of skilled labor. 
25. The task intensity data are constructed by matching Census 1980 data by 
occupation and gender with task measures from the Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles (DOT). Task intensities by occupational skill percentile are plotted using a 
locally weighted smoothing regression with bandwidth 0.5 (meaning, one-half of 
one percentile). Details on the processing and matching of DOT task measures to 
occupations are given in Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003). The abstract task cat-
egory we use in Figure 4.10 is the arithmetic average of ALM’s “non-routine cog-
nitive/analytic” and “non-routine cognitive/interactive” category and, similarly, 
our routine task category is the average of ALM’s “routine manual” and “routine 
cognitive” categories. Our manual category is equivalent to ALM’s “non-routine 
manual” category. 
26.  Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) present a similar analysis using Census data 
for changes in occupational employment and CPS May/ORG data for changes 
in wage levels by earnings percentile. In the present analysis, we use exclusively 
Census data covering the same time periods. 
27. We employ a consistent set of occupation codes developed by Meyers and 
Osborne (2005) for Census years 1980, 1990 and 2000. We use a locally weighted 
smoothing regression (bandwidth 0.8 with 100 observations) to ﬁ  t the relation-
ship between decadal growth in occupational employment share and occupa-
tions’ initial skill percentile in the 1980 skill distribution.
28.  In contrast to the upper panel of Figure 4.9, we use raw changes in employ-
ment shares by occupational wage percentile as the dependent variable, rather 
than smoothed changes. If instead we were to use smoothed changes, these would 
not affect the point estimates by much, but would suggest a misleadingly high 
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29.  Notably, this pattern appears inconsistent with the hypothesis that a declin-
ing minimum wage played a leading role in the expansion of lower-tail inequality 
in the 1980s. A decline in a binding wage ﬂ  oor should have lead to a (modest) rise 
in low-wage employment rather than a sharp contraction. 
30. It is critical to distinguish service occupations, a relatively narrow group 
of low-educational level occupations comprising 13.4 percent of employment 
in 2000 (author’s calculation from Census IPUMS), from the service sector, a 
very broad category of industries ranging from healthcare to communications to 
real estate, and comprising 81 percent of non-farm employment in 2000 (www.
bls.gov).
31. The service employment measure used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Occupational Outlook indicates a service employment share that is several per-
centage points higher that our calculations (17.7 percent versus 13.4 percent). The 
discrepancy stems from three factors: unlike our calculations based on household 
data from the Census Bureau, the BLS numbers use Current Employment Statis-
tics (CES) which, as an establishment survey, double-counts workers who hold 
multiple jobs; our Census-based numbers are weighted by hours of labor sup-
ply, and so part-time jobs (common in service occupations) are weighted down 
whereas the CES data count all jobs equally. Our Census calculations exclude 
workers younger than 18 years of age, whereas the CES data include workers 
aged 16 years and above. The service occupation in which the Census and CES 
data are most divergent is in Food Preparation and Service, where our data show 
a 3.5 percent employment share and the CES data show a 7.4 percent employ-
ment share. Despite these discrepancies in levels, we have no reason to believe 
that the qualitative employment trends in the Census and CES data differ. 
32. The BLS category of professional occupations excludes managerial occupa-
tions, and so is more disaggregated than the Census category of professional and 
managerial occupations. Combined growth in professional and managerial jobs 
is projected at 8.2 million jobs, or 18.8 percent. 
33.  Though computerization appears far more complementary to abstract tasks 
than non-routine manual tasks, our framework implies that computerization is a 
relative complement to all non-routine tasks (meaning, relative to routine tasks). 
34. Though in many respects computerization and outsourcing appear to have 
similar implications for the domestic organization of work (Levy and Murnane 
2006), one important difference is that there is an important subset of non-routine 
manual tasks that are not readily computerized but can be easily outsourced—for 
example, call center operations or back ofﬁ  ce manual tasks, including data entry 
and hand-processing of bill and check images (see Autor, Levy, and Murnane 
2002). However, neither outsourcing nor computerization appears a close sub-
stitute for the in-persons tasks performed by service occupations (see Blinder 
2007).
35.  DeLong, Goldin, and Katz (2003) provide a thoughtful, extended discussion 
of policies to improve U.S. human capital investment. 
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36. This reﬂ   ects both a high non-completion rate and an increased time to 
degree. Thus, the share of youth obtaining the equivalent of a four-year college 
degree by age 28 has risen signiﬁ  cantly more than the share of youth obtaining 
the degree by 23.  
37.  See Heckman and Krueger (2004) for a comprehensive debate. 
38.  See also Heckman and Krueger (2004). 
39. Denominators for these calculations come from U.S. Department of Educa-
tion (2005, Table 170). 
40. There is heated debate about the extent to which low-skilled immigration 
depresses native wages (see Borjas 2003; Card 2005; Goldin and Katz 2007). 
Recent evidence suggests that because the jobs of many low-skilled immigrants 
are heavily concentrated in “manual” tasks such as cleaning, cooking, and con-
struction, they do not directly compete with most native-born workers, including 
low-skilled Americans who typically have a comparative advantage in English 
language communication tasks (Cortes 2007; Peri and Sparber 2007). 
41. Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) provide a strong test of human capital exter-
nalities and ﬁ  nd that they are weak or nonexistent. 
42. Freeman (2006, p. 20) compellingly states this case: “If ﬁ  rms demand more 
labor than workers supply due to a reduced growth of supply, should not a coun-
try that relies extensively on unfettered markets allow those markets to raise 
the price of labor, just as it allowed them to reduce the pay of many in recent 
decades?”
43. Autor and Dorn (2007) report that the median hourly wage in service jobs 
was between 63 and 65 percent of the median hourly wage in non-service jobs in 
1970, 1980, and 1990. Accounting for differences in full-compensation (includ-
ing health insurance, vacation and sick leave) among high and low-wage workers 
(as in Pierce 2001) would enlarge this gap. 
44. Recent research by Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2007) ﬁ  nds little change in 
mobility over the course of a career among U.S. cohorts born between 1920 and 
1950. However, these data do not speak to economic mobility across generations, 
in particular, how likely it is that children from low-income households reach 
higher echelons of the earnings distribution during their careers. 
45. For example, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), 
enacted in 1997, has signiﬁ  cantly increased the health insurance coverage rate of 
children from low-income households (Lo Sasso and Buchmueller 2004). SCHIP 
is a block grant program with ﬁ  xed annual funding levels, however, and SCHIP 
outlays have not kept pace with population increase or the rising cost of health-
care. Absent a signiﬁ  cant policy change, the number of program beneﬁ  ciaries will 
have to decline. The U.S. minimum wage provides another example of a politi-
cally vulnerable policy instrument for raising earnings of low-skill workers. 
46. See Hsieh and Woo (2005) for a rigorous assessment of the impact of out-
sourcing to China on the Hong Kong labor market.How Structural Shifts in Labor Demand Affect Labor Supply Prospects 204
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Comments on “Structural Demand Shifts 
and Potential Labor Supply Responses in 
the New Century” by David H. Autor
Jared Bernstein
Introduction 
David Autor has written an insightful and admirable paper, which in 
important ways updates economists’ thinking about one of the more 
important questions in labor economics: what is the relationship between 
skill demands, technological change, and wage inequality? 
I’ll stress the insights from the paper below, but what’s admirable about 
its contribution? Well, as J.M. Keynes famously said when confronted 
with accusations regarding shifts in his analysis: “When my information 
changes, I change my opinion. What do you do, sir?” A healthy debate 
regarding the impact of skill-biased technological change has simmered 
among economists for a few years now, and some of us believed that the 
trends in the wage data did not support conventional wisdom. With this 
paper, building on his earlier work, Autor agrees with this contrarian 
assessment, and his more nuanced view of the issue is both gratifying and 
interesting.1
Below, I offer some objections to the plasticity with which Autor treats 
the concept of skill-biased technological change. One has the sense that 
he and his fellow authors remained wedded to this concept and loathe to 
let it go, so they’ve morphed the deﬁ  nition in ways that may strike some 
as stretching the concept to the breaking point. Also, in the course of 
this review, I question a) whether the original construction of skill-biased 
technological change provided an adequate description of the trends 
observed in wage inequality, and b) whether Autor’s new interpretation is 
sufﬁ  cient to explain more recent relative wage trends, such as those that 
prevailed in the latter 1990s or over the 2000s. But for those of us who How Structural Shifts in Labor Demand Affect Labor Supply Prospects 210
have been skeptical of skill-biased technological change as the dominant 
explanatory factor in the growth of wage inequality in recent decades, 
Autor’s evolving views are a welcome point of departure.
Motivation: That Pesky Trend in the 50/10 Wage Percentiles
As Autor shows in his Figure 4.2, the character of hourly wage inequality 
in the United States has changed over time. In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
wage distribution was fanning out largely monotonically: as your wage 
level went up, so did your wage growth. The top income groups pulled 
away from the middle; the middle income groups pulled away from the 
groups at the bottom of the wage distribution. Over the 1990s, however, 
growth rates were much more comparable at the middle and the bottom 
of the distribution. In fact, depending on which end points you choose, 
there was even some compression of the 50/10 ratio since the mid-to-late 
1980s, especially for men.
Larry Mishel and I viewed this change as quite important, and thus 
focus on it in various editions of The State of Working America, in 
part because the compression of the 50/10 ratio raises questions about 
the economist’s most popular answer for the “why” of growing wage 
inequality: skill-biased technological change. Among others (see Howell 
and Wolff 1992, Handel 2000, and Card and Dinardo 2002), we won-
dered why the skill demands of the workplace in the 1990s, a period 
of very deep, if not downright bubbly, technological capital deepening, 
would be more complementary to low-wage workers than had been the 
case in earlier years.
It seemed to us then, and still does now, that if skill-biased technologi-
cal change were the main perpetrator of higher wage inequality, relative 
wage trends should look more like Autor’s Figure 4.2, bottom line, than 
this ﬁ  gure’s top line. Autor, in an earlier paper written with Levy and 
Murnane (2001), analyzes occupations from the perspective of skill con-
tent and tasks, and asks whether those tasks are complementary or sub-
stitutable to computer technology. In that paper, they raise the hypothesis 
that the skill content of recent technological change, particularly regard-
ing the impact of computers on skill demands, may not generate the 
monotonic trends in relative wages that a basic skill-biased technological 
change hypothesis predicts. 
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With this paper, as with Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006), Autor fur-
ther develops a different version of skill-biased technological change, 
which is, as he puts it, “a richer version of the skill-biased technical 
change hypothesis, which posits that information technology comple-
ments highly educated workers engaged in abstract tasks, substitutes 
for moderately educated workers performing routine tasks, and has less 
impact on low-skilled workers performing manual tasks.”
Two Questions
Autor’s new view raises two questions. First, does the theory that Autor 
and his co-authors have been developing comport with the data in a last-
ing manner? That is, given a) his earlier research ﬁ  ndings suggesting non-
monotonic demand impacts, and b) the fact that the relative wage data 
trends failed to support the old view, Autor came up with an interesting 
and plausible explanation that ﬁ  ts the part of the data for which the 
old view did not. But if the new view fails to ﬁ  t the further evolution 
of wage inequality, Autor and his coauthors will be forced to invent an 
even “richer version of the skill-biased technological change hypothesis.” 
Going down that path can lead to “ad hockery” and, while spinning of 
lots of interesting analysis, an enriched explanation is unlikely to provide 
analysts and policymakers with a reliable sense as to the determinants of 
wage inequality’s growth.
If that does indeed turn out to be the case, as I suspect it might (sup-
porting evidence to follow), many would be compelled to conclude that 
skill-biased technological change, an obviously important theory in ways 
I describe below, is insufﬁ  cient to explain the path of wage inequality. This 
is the second big question that this paper raises: is skill-biased technologi-
cal change the right horse to bet on in the race to explain the evolution of 
wage inequality in our economy, or for that matter, any economy?
Let us ﬁ  rst examine this second question, regarding the usefulness of 
skill-biased technological change as a framework for explaining and 
understanding wage inequality. All economists recognize that technol-
ogy tends to boost labor demand for those workers whose skills are 
complementary to that technology (and, conversely, reduce demand for 
the technology’s substitutes). And the long-term reality of capital skill 
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main reason why we can double the share of four-year college graduates, 
as we have done over the past 30 years, yet maintain their unemployment 
rate at frictional levels (typically at around 2 percent, per year).
But whether technology and human skills are complements is not the 
question being asked in this literature. The question asked is whether 
the extent of this complementarity has increased in a manner that would 
explain the pattern of wage inequality observed over the past few decades. 
As Mishel and I view it in a series of papers from the latter 1990s (some 
co-authored with John Schmitt), the key question was whether skill-
biased technological change had accelerated to such a degree that it could 
explain the acceleration in wage inequality.2 
In statistical analysis, we tested for the acceleration of skill-biased 
technological change by regressing changes in wage inequality across 
industries on measures of capital investment associated with technology, 
and allowing the coefﬁ  cients on those variables to change over time. We 
found no consistent evidence to support the notion that skill-biased tech-
nological change and its impact on wage inequality had accelerated.
Interestingly, we found evidence against accelerating skill demands in 
work by economists closely tied to the skill-biased technological change 
story. Katz, in various papers [most recent in work with Goldin (2008)], 
uses a simple CES production function model of the labor market to cre-
ate indexes of labor supply and demand by skill level, stretching back 
many decades. Note that these models examine just one dimension of 
wage inequality: that existing between college-educated and non-col-
lege-educated workers. So-called residual wage inequality—the part not 
explained by the usual regressors in human capital models—is not part 
of this analysis (analysis like that in Autor’s Figure 4.2 captures both 
residual and “between group” aspects of wage inequality). 
The Katz/Goldin model assumes that changes in relative wages (skilled 
relative to unskilled workers, or college-educated to noncollege-educated 
workers) are a function of shifting demand and supplies of different types 
of labor, the degree to which relative supply changes effect relative wages 
(the substitution elasticity),3 and technological progress.
For our purposes in evaluating the utility of skill-biased technological 
change and the case for accelerating wage inequality, the relevant outputs 
from the model are changes in relative demand for skills across decades. 
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If unmet skill demands are accelerating, meaning these are unmet by 
increasing skill supplies, the result will be accelerating relative wages, the 
pace of which is partly determined in the model by the degree to which 
relative skill-changes map onto relative wages through the substitution 
elasticity. All else equal, a larger substitution elasticity will diminish the 
growth of relative wages, because employers can more easily substitute 
away from more expensive workers. 
For points I turn to next, it is important to recognize that the demand 
index is a residual. This is important for our alternative story, since we 
and others argue that there’s more than demand embedded in that term. 
In fact, any nonsupply factor—tighter job markets or lower minimum 
wages—that affects relative wages gets subsumed under demand here, 
a critique we return to below. The top panel in Table 4.3 just reprints 
Goldin and Katz’s table, showing that that relative wages grew most 
quickly in the 1980s, in fact more quickly than in any decade since 1940. 
The second column, relative supply growth, shows the 1970s was a 
decade when the share of college-educated workers grew quickly, leading 
to a compression in the relative wage. Since then, relative skill supplies 
have increased more slowly, especially in the 2000s. 
But our focus is on the demand column, shown in panel B. Some 
authors simply interpret the positive values in this column as evidence 
of skill-biased technological change driving up relative demand, and thus 
see this as the key determinant of the between-education group part of 
wage inequality. But our model argues that unless these decadal demand 
indexes are accelerating, these are insufﬁ  cient to explain the acceleration 
in wage inequality over these years. It is the second derivative that mat-
ters, not the ﬁ  rst.
And, in fact, the demand index shows quite a signiﬁ  cant deceleration 
over much—but not all—of the last few decades. This deceleration seems 
really quite revealing. According to this simple but plausible and widely 
accepted model of the labor market, the rate of change in relative demand 
for skills was slower in the 1990s than the 1980s, and slower still in the 
2000s, at least through 2005. 
In fact, compared to the 1980s, demand for skills in the 2000s (through 
2005) grew 3.6 log points per year more slowly. This decline seems par-
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ization and information technology in general since the 1980s. Surely, 
the spread of information technology has accelerated. The literature 
explaining the post-1995 acceleration in productivity growth is, in fact, 
quite clear on this point: the spread of computers and information tech-
nology explains most of productivity’s acceleration.4 In this climate, if 
skill-biased technological change were truly a critical determinant of rela-
tive wage trends by education level, would we not expect to see a sharp 
acceleration of relative demand? Instead, the model yields the opposite 
ﬁ  nding. 
Other authors, such as Handel, Howell, and Wolfe (see various cita-
tions in references) had similar ﬁ  ndings, noting that the timing of infor-
mation technology’s capital deepening did not match the changes in wage 
Table 4.3
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Source: Author’s analysis of Goldin and Katz (2007), Table 1, using their pre-
ferred subsition elasticity of 1.64 (implying that a 10 percent increase in the rela-
tive supply of college graduates lowers the college premium by 6.1 percent (1/.61 
= 1.64)).
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inequality such that skill-biased technological change would be a likely 
determinant. Card and DiNardo (2002) derived various tests of the skill-
biased technological change (SBTC) hypothesis, and they too found little 
supporting evidence: “we conclude that the SBTC hypothesis is not very 
helpful in understanding the myriad shifts in the structure of wages that 
have occurred over the past three decades.”
So if skill-biased technological change is not the reason, what has been 
the main driver of wage inequality over these years? Our work has found 
that there is no smoking gun, no single factor that explains more than 
half of the growth in wage inequality. Instead, there appear to be many 
perpetrators, including high unemployment, the sharp expansion of 
unbalanced international trade, the decline in the real value of the mini-
mum wage, and the decline in unions. Many of these factors ﬁ  t within an 
“institutional” framework, and are very compellingly discussed in Levy 
and Temin’s recent paper (2007), an analysis all the more fascinating 
since Levy’s arguments used to be squarely in the skill-biased technologi-
cal change camp. Along with Temin, Levy now writes:
[T]he current trend toward greater inequality in America is primarily the result 
of a change in economic policy that took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
The stability in income equality where wages rose with national productivity for 
a generation after the Second World War was the result of policies that began 
in the Great Depression with the New Deal and were ampliﬁ  ed by both public 
and private actions after the war. This stability was not the result of a natural 
economy; it was the result of policies designed to promote it (41–42).
As Levy and Temin stress, it’s not the case that skill-biased technogi-
cal change is not important, it’s that a) wage differentials are often 
moved by changes in institutional arrangements favoring one class of 
worker over another, and b) skill-biased technological change has been 
a fairly smooth, ongoing dynamic in our economy, consistently driving 
up employers’ skill demands. But the institutional context within which 
skill-biased technological change occurs is highly determinative of rela-
tive wage outcomes.
In the interest of honest, full disclosure, there’s no smoking gun for 
the institutional explanations either. Solid research casts doubt on skill-
biased technological change and much work, including our analysis in 
many editions of The State of Working America, conﬁ  rms the important 
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Autor and his co-authors would be well within their rights to point out 
that our evidence is also limited. We can point to various studies showing 
that declining union membership explains 10–20 percent of the increase 
in wage inequality, with international trade and the impact of the mini-
mum wage each also contributing about the same percentage. But, as 
Autor notes (see his note 14) there is not enough convincing work on 
these causes either.5
In the next section, I explore the ﬁ  rst question raised above: is Autor’s 
newer model likely to offer a more reliable interpretation of the factors 
behind rising wage inequality?
As in Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006), Autor’s analysis is based on the 
shifts in employment by occupation, along with the educational compo-
sition of the occupations over time. Occupations constitute a legitimate 
source of variation in this type of work, since it is widely assumed that 
occupational demands necessarily embody technological change.
Autor’s key ﬁ   gure supporting this analysis is Figure 4.9, panel A, 
which contrasts the monotonic pattern of occupation skill demands of 
the 1980s with the more U-shaped pattern of the 1990s. The signiﬁ  cant 
accomplishment here bears remark: Autor has crafted a model which 
explains the changing pattern of wage inequality over the 1980–2000 
period. Whether it is legitimate to call it skill-biased technological change 
is another matter, as I discussed above and elaborate upon in the conclu-
sion. But this is laudable, interesting work that advances our understand-
ing of the labor market.
But is it built to last? Is Autor’s model telling us something important 
about the causal factors behind wage inequality—providing actionable 
intelligence, as the saying goes—that we can count on continuing in a 
way that should inform policy? Or is this model simply mapping relative 
wage trends onto occupations in a way that will change again when the 
relative wage trends shift again?
To test this, I derived a simple (too simple?), “poor man’s AKK” (that’s 
Autor, Katz, Kearney, where this model ﬁ  rst appeared) model of occupa-
tional employment, weighted by hours and wages.6 Sophistication-wise, 
my method is a mere shadow of Autor’s, but my results for the 1980s and 
1990s roughly match his; see Figure 4.11 for my 1980s version, which, 
due to a coding change, only goes from 1984–1989. My Figure 4.12 
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Figure 4.11 
Change in Occupational Employment Shares by Wage Ventile, 1984–1989
Source: Current Population Survey.
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roughly reﬂ  ects the polarization the Autor ﬁ  nds, but my results only ﬁ  nd 
evidence for this in the years 1989–1995. That’s because much work at 
Economic Policy Institute has found that the latter 1990s were a very 
unique period for wage inequality, as the ﬁ  rst full employment job mar-
ket in decades gave a lift to U.S. workers’ bargaining power. 
Given that important dynamic, I plotted the latter 1990s separately in 
Figure 4.13, and these seem to revert back to the earlier, more monotonic 
pattern. This is quite an interesting ﬁ  nding, in that we know relative 
wages were compressing between middle- and low-wage workers over 
this period, yet the model shows a pattern of relative demand much like 
that of the 1980s. 
Finally, I plot the 2000s through 2006 in Figure 4.14. This decade (so 
far) takes on more polarizating characteristics, although one could also 
view this change as showing weak or negative skill demands throughout 
most of the skill distribution, except at the very top, possibly due to the 
uniquely weak job creation that prevailed over this period.How Structural Shifts in Labor Demand Affect Labor Supply Prospects 218
Based on the differences in our methods, this exercise by no means 
establishes a claim that Autor is wrong. But if his model’s method really 
yields quite different results regarding the nature of skill demands over 
relatively short time periods, we need to wonder what it is really telling 
us. If the full employment of the latter 1990s raised the bargaining power 
of less-skilled workers enough to move these curves around, as my work 
suggests, then we do not want to conﬂ  ate that change with a shift in the 
nature of skill-biased technological change.
I thus encourage Autor to apply his method to these other time peri-
ods, including the 2000s, to see if and how the results change over dif-
ferent time periods.
A second and ﬁ  nal critique of Autor’s method relates to the underly-
ing elasticities implied by the work. The movements in the occupational 
index in a given decade are actually very small compared to the move-
ments in relative wages. The 50/10 ratio falls by about .10 percentage 
points over the 1990–2000 period. Autor’s Figure 4.9 reveals that the 
demand at the median fell about 0.0005 points, while demand at the low 
Figure 4.12 
Change in Occupational Employment Shares by Wage Ventile, 1989–1995
Source: Current Population Survey.
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end rose about the same absolute amount. It seems unlikely that such a 
small shift in the occupational shares could really be the major factor 
driving relative wage trends of this magnitude.
As Autor has pointed out to me in a private conversation, the Autor, 
Katz, and Kearney model does not measure underlying shifts in supply 
and demand, along with relevant elasticities, as does the Katz model fea-
tured in Table 1. Instead, the model by Autor, Katz, and Kearney is driven 
by, in Autor’s words, “realized prices and quantities,” meaning the occu-
pational and wage outcomes of an implicit labor demand and supply 
model that is a lot more complicated than the simple, two-skill Katz ver-
sion. Underlying this implicit model is a rich set of elasticities regarding 
the ease with which employers can substitute different types of workers 
over a broad range of tasks—tasks which, unlike levels of educational 
attainment, are not necessarily exogenous.7
All of which leads one to conclude that Autor, Katz, and Kearney’s 
model may be telling a small part of the story of shifts in relative skill/
labor demand. Other factors must be playing an important role as well, 
Figure 4.13 
Change in Occupational Employment Shares by Wage Ventile, 1995–2000
Source: Current Population Survey.
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a point that I suspect Autor, an economist with an open mind and a 
demonstrable interest in a wide range of causes, would agree with.
Conclusion
Though I have not pulled any punches in expressing the difﬁ  culty that I 
and others have had in assigning a primary role to skill-biased techno-
logical change in the wage inequality debate, I still ﬁ  nd that this paper 
represents a useful contribution to that debate. Autor does what good 
economists should do: when the old model stops working, you build a 
new one. One can raise concerns, as I do, as to whether the new one has 
any more explanatory power than the old one, outside of a speciﬁ  c time 
period, perhaps a relatively short period—he says the 1990s; I say the 
early 1990s—wherein it ﬁ  ts the data. In this regard, I hope and expect 
Autor to keep testing whether his polarization model continues to ﬁ  t the 
trends in relative wages.
Figure 4.14 
Change in Occupational Employment Shares by Wage Ventile, 2000–2006
Source: Current Population Survey.
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One ﬁ  nal policy point: I don’t think Autor (or Autor, Katz, and Kear-
ney, for that matter) should refer to the pattern of relative demand they 
discover in the 1990s as skill-biased technological change. For that label 
to apply, technology must be monotonically biased toward skilled work-
ers and against unskilled ones. In their new co-authored work, skill is 
biased toward the high end, and—perhaps to a lesser extent, but still—
toward the low end. 
Words matter. And the hurly-burly world of Washington, DC eco-
nomic policy—the world I travel in—sustains little in the way of subtle 
discourse. Among DC policy makers, skill-biased technological change 
translates into the notion that employers’ skill demands continue to shift 
hard against non-college-educated workers. As they envision it, the shift 
is absolutely monotonic; there’s little room, I fear, for the notion that 
“skill bias” as Autor now understands it doesn’t really mean skill bias as 
they understand it. 
Autor could explain that the concept of skill-biased technological 
change now means a bias in favor of high- and low-end workers and a 
bias against middle-wage workers. That’s what he’s trying to establish in 
this paper, and he makes the case. But why insist on calling it skill bias? 
The policy implications are signiﬁ  cant. If you believe in the traditional 
skill-biased technological change story, you’re prone to think exclusively 
in terms of education and job training. If you instead think in terms of 
Autor’s concept of skill-biased technological change, along with those 
critical skill-enhancement policies, you also recognize that demand for 
less-skilled jobs is strong and will remain so. And that leads economic 
policymakers to worry about the quality of the jobs available to the 
American workforce, not just the quality of the labor supply. 
As I noted, Keynes would have liked this paper—a very ﬁ  ne compli-
ment indeed. I urge Autor and his co-authors to continue testing this 
model as new trends form to see if it consistently describes the evolving 
patterns in relative wages. I also urge them to keep looking for other 
explanations that may have less to do with skill biases and technology, 
and more to do with bargaining power, full employment, and institu-
tional forces within which a full and complete concept of skill-biased 
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Notes
1. These new views on the impact of skill-biased technological change on wage 
inequality appeared in an earlier paper of which Autor was a co-author. See 
Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006).
2.  See, for example, Mishel and Bernstein (1998).
3.  That is, how would an increase in the supply of less-skilled workers affect the 
demand for more-skilled workers? If substitution between these two groups is a 
simple matter for employers, then the falling relative price of less-skilled workers 
would induce employers to use more of them. But if skill requirements are such 
that employers cannot easily substitute less-skilled for more skilled workers, then 
the decline in relative price will have less impact of changes in employment.
4.  Oliner and Sichel (2000).
5. Autor, Katz, and Kearney are very much aware of these institutional forces 
and test the impacts of unemployment and minimum wages. As Autor notes (note 
14), they don’t ﬁ  nd much, but their analysis is fairly cursory, as they include both 
the minimum wage and the national unemployment rate (male, prime age) in a 
reduced-form, time series model with relative wages by education as the depen-
dent variable. More detailed work, such as that cited by Autor in the aforemen-
tioned note, taps both geographical variation and examines the impact of tight 
labor markets on wages at various deciles, and these analyses reveal a greater 
impact.
6.  Using Current Population Survey data, I calculated hours-weighted occupation 
employment shares (using three-digit codes) and rank them by their average wage 
level over the time period in question. I then calculate the changes in these shares 
between the two periods. Next, I ﬁ  nd the ventile cutpoints in the cumulative dis-
tribution of these changes, and plot them, along with a polynomial curve.
7. Unlike quasi-ﬁ  xed education levels, tasks that workers undertake can change 
quickly in response to relatively prices (i.e., the wages associated with the task). 
In the model underlying Autor’s recent work (meaning Autor,Katz, and Kearney, 
2006), workers reallocate time from routine to non-routine tasks as the price of 
routine tasks declines, so such changes are endogenous to price changes. 
References
Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney. 2006. “The Polariza-
tion of the U.S. Labor Market.” American Economic Review 96(2): 189–194. 
Autor, David H., Frank Levy, and Richard Murnane. 2001. “The Skill Content 
of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration,” NBER Working 
Paper No. 8337.
Card, David, and John E. DiNardo. 2002. “Skill-Based Technological Change 
And Rising Wage Inequality: Some Problems And Puzzles.” Journal of Labor 
Economics 20(4): 733–783.
223 Jared Bernstein
Goldin, Claudia, and Lawrence F. Katz. 2007. “The Race between Education 
and Technology: The Evolution of U.S. Educational Wage Differentials, 1890 to 
2005.” NBER Working Paper No. 12984. 
Handel, Michael J. 2000. “Is There a Skills Crisis? Trends in Job Skill Require-
ments, Technology, and Wage Inequality in the United States.” Jerome Levy Eco-
nomics Institute Working Paper 295.
Howell, David. 1994. “The Skills Myth.” American Prospect 5(18). Available 
online at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_skills_myth
Howell, David, and Edward Wolff. 1991. “Trends in the Growth and Distribu-
tion of Skills in the U.S. Workplace, 1960-1985.” Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review 44(3): 486–502.
Howell, David, and Edward Wolff. 1992. “Technical Change and the Demand 
for Skills by U.S. Industries.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 16(2): 127–146.
Levy, Frank, and Peter Temin. 2007. “Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century 
America.” Mimeograph, Department of Urban Studies and Planning and Depart-
ment of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Mishel, Lawrence, and Jared Bernstein. 1998. “Technology and the Wage Struc-
ture: Had Technology’s Impact Accelerated Since the 1970s?” Research in Labor 
Economics 17: 305–355.
Oliner, Stephan D., and Daniel E. Sichel. 2000. “The Resurgence of Growth in 
the Late 1990s: Is Information Technology the Story?’’ Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 14(4): 3–22. Comments on “Structural Demand Shifts 
and Potential Labor Supply Responses in 
the New Century” by David H. Autor
Gary Burtless
David Autor has written a clear, judicious, and even-handed survey of 
recent evidence on shifts in demand for U.S. labor, particularly the shifts 
that affect American employers’ demand for skills. Since Autor is himself 
a major contributor to this literature, it is hardly surprising he has done 
such a ﬁ  ne job.
Almost everyone who regularly reads a daily paper or subscribes to 
a business magazine recognizes that earnings inequality in the United 
States has increased without interruption over the past three decades. 
Household income disparities have risen, too, and the growth in earnings 
inequality is an important contributor to this rise. 
Autor’s paper lucidly explains a crucial fact about the increase in 
earned income inequality. Earnings disparities did not actually rise uni-
formly and steadily over time. There have been major changes in the pat-
tern of change in inequality. From the late 1970s up to the early 1990s, 
earnings inequality increased in almost every dimension. Workers earn-
ing the lowest wages saw their earnings fall in relation to median wages. 
Workers earning wages close to the middle of the distribution saw their 
earnings fall in comparison to wages at the top. Contrary to a common 
impression, however, this basic pattern did not continue uninterrupted 
up to the present day. It came to an end sometime around 1990. Since 
then earnings inequality has risen at the top—the earners with the high-
est wages are still pulling away from earners in the middle—but the bot-
tom is not falling further behind the middle. Autor’s Figures 4.2 and 4.3 
show a sharp break in the pattern of increasing inequality around 1990. 
Now low-wage workers are pulling to closer workers in the middle, and 
have closed part of the earnings gap that opened up in the 1980s. How Structural Shifts in Labor Demand Affect Labor Supply Prospects 226
The shift in the pattern of growing wage inequality naturally has impli-
cations for how we think about the demand-side changes that may be 
contributing to wider earnings inequality. Theories that account for the 
trends in the 1980s may not do a good job of accounting for develop-
ments after 1990. Of course, some theories that helped explain why labor 
incomes at the very top of the distribution rose so much in the 1980s 
might do a reasonable job in accounting for wage trends after 1990. 
However, theories that explained the 1980s decline in relative wages at 
bottom of the distribution may have to be modiﬁ  ed to reﬂ  ect the fact that 
wages at the bottom have partly recovered since 1990.
Autor and a variety of his coauthors offer a plausible demand-side the-
ory that accounts for the earnings pattern we have seen since the early 
1990s. In recent years advances in information technology and communi-
cations methods have signiﬁ  cantly increased the demand for the cognitive, 
decision-making, and interpersonal skills of managers and professionals 
who are adept at performing abstract, non-routine tasks. The same tech-
nical advances have reduced the relative demand for routine clerical, ana-
lytical, and mechanical tasks that can now be performed more cheaply 
with the assistance of inexpensive machines, such as personal computers. 
Technical advance has been less successful in reducing the need for people 
who perform some of the economy’s least-well paid tasks, many of which 
require the on-the-spot presence of a manual worker. Autor notes that a 
variety of low-skill, low-pay, service sector occupations ﬁ  t this descrip-
tion—health aides, security guards, hospital orderlies, cleaners, and serv-
ers. The result is a surge in relative demand for very highly skilled workers 
who can perform abstract, non-routine tasks, comparative stability in the 
demand for workers with the lowest skills, and a decline in the relative 
demand for workers with a middle range of skills. 
I do not have any basic disagreement with this theory, which seems to 
me quite plausible. In addition to the technical and globalization trends 
that Autor emphasizes, however, I think there has also been a change in 
wage-setting practices inside of private ﬁ  rms. In the private sector as a 
whole, the change has occurred partly because unions represent a shrink-
ing percentage of the American workforce. Unions now exercise direct 
and indirect inﬂ  uence over wages in a narrower and narrower slice of the 
private labor market. Since unions tended to equalize the wages of work-
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ers across skill categories, the reduced inﬂ  uence of unions has tended to 
weaken the bargaining power of many workers who perform routine, 
repetitive tasks. Shifts in pay-setting norms within large companies and 
innovations in executive compensation arrangements have also helped 
fuel wage growth at the very top of the pay structure. As already noted, 
this phenomenon has continued up to the present day, and it may con-
tinue in the future.
In the remainder of my comments I want to focus on a deep mys-
tery regarding the supply-side response to the demand-side developments 
Autor describes. In particular, why has the response been so sluggish and 
small? And why has it been particularly small among American men? 
The average payoff to post-high-school formal education has risen, but 
the schooling and skill attainments of U.S. workers, especially men, have 
increased relatively little, both absolutely and in comparison with trends 
in other rich industrialized countries.
As noted in Autor’s paper, one of the most important contributors to 
the growth in U.S. wage inequality has been the growing premium that 
people derive from earning a formal degree after high school. Figure 4.15 
shows my own estimates of the earnings premium received by workers for 
completing a four-year college degree and earning a postcollege degree. 
The chart displays estimates of the log earnings difference between high 
school graduates and two groups of workers with higher levels of school 
attainment, college graduates and workers with at least one postcollege 
degree. To measure the premium for four-year college degrees and post-
college degrees, I regressed the logarithm of workers’ annual labor earn-
ings on age and educational attainment for years between 1968 and 2005 
using the Census Bureau’s March Current Population Survey ﬁ  les. In 
order to reduce the sampling variability of the displayed results, estimates 
shown in Figure 4.15 reﬂ  ect the centered average of regression coefﬁ  -
cients for ﬁ  ve successive calendar years. The estimation sample includes 
full-time, year-round workers between 25 and 64 years old who have a 
valid report of their annual labor income, including both wages and net 
self-employment earnings.1 
The top and bottom panels of Figure 4.15 show sizeable increases in 
the earnings premium enjoyed by college and postcollege degree holders 
during much of the period after 1980. Female degree holders saw their How Structural Shifts in Labor Demand Affect Labor Supply Prospects 228
Figure 4.15 
U.S. Trends in Earnings Premium for a Four-Year College Degree versus a
High School Diploma, 1968–2005
Source: Author’s tabulations of 1969–2006 March Current Population 
Survey files.
Note: The figure shows trends in the log pay differential between earnings 
of the indicated educational group and U.S. workers of the same sex who 
have a high school diploma. To reduce sampling variability, the chart shows
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educational pay premium rise substantially between 1980 and 1992, 
but their gains since 1992 have been very small; see Figure 4.15’s lower 
panel. The increase in the educational pay premium persisted over more 
years for male degree holders, but their gains appear to have slowed or 
stopped in the late 1990s, as shown in the top panel of Figure 4.15. Since 
four-year college completion has become more common among working-
age Americans, the rise in the payoff to advanced schooling has occurred 
against a backdrop of an increasing relative supply of well-educated 
workers. This development leads many labor economists to infer that 
the rising earnings premium for higher education must have signaled a 
rise in the relative demand for highly educated workers. The fact that the 
earnings premium for college and postcollege degrees stopped increasing 
in the middle or late 1990s suggests that some of the factors pushing up 
relative demand for highly educated workers slowed or the availability of 
college-educated workers increased. 
Figure 4.16 shows estimates of the earnings penalty suffered by U.S. 
workers if they have failed to complete secondary school. The estimates 
were obtained using the same method and with the same sample described 
above. These results show that the pay differential between high school 
dropouts and graduates widened between 1980 and the late 1990s, but 
the differential has not widened much in recent years.
Now we come to the puzzle. Why was the supply-side response to 
these relative wage changes so sluggish and small? Figure 4.17 shows 
the trend in college completion rates in the U.S. population between the 
ages 25 and 34 years. This group is comprised of young adults who have 
just attained an age where we should expect that they have completed 
their college education. The broken line in the chart indicates college 
completion rates among women; the solid line shows the same trends 
among men. The ﬁ   nancial reward for completing a four-year college 
degree rose steadily and strongly from 1979 to 2000, but college comple-
tion rates rose relatively slowly for women in the 1980s and actually 
declined among 25–34 year-old men in the same decade. College comple-
tion rates for young men and women improved in the 1990s. Nonethe-
less, the college completion rate for men is about the same in 2006 as 
it was in the late 1970s, when the pay premium for a four-year college 
degree was considerably smaller than it is today; see Figure 4.15. Young How Structural Shifts in Labor Demand Affect Labor Supply Prospects 230
women apparently pay closer attention to wage trends described in the 
daily papers and business magazines. Today, college completion rates for 
women are appreciably higher than in the late 1970s. Their completion 
rates are, in fact, currently higher than young men’s college completion 
rates. We cannot reject the hypothesis that young women are somewhat 
smarter or more forward-looking than young men. Even among women 
the trends shown in Figure 4.17 represent a bit of a mystery. The pay pre-
mium for a four-year college degree and a postcollege degree rose more 
strongly between 1980 and 1992 than it did in earlier or later years, as 
shown in the lower panel of Figure 4.15. Yet the trend toward higher 
college completion rates actually decelerated in that period. Even young 
women appear slow in responding to price signals in the job market.
Figure 4.16 
U.S. Trends in the Earnings Penalty for Failure to Complete High School,
1968–2005
Source: Author’s tabulations of 1969–2006 March Current Population 
Survey files.
Note: The figure shows trends in the log pay differential between earnings 
of U.S. high school dropouts and workers of the same sex who have a high 
school diploma. The sample consists of full-time, year-round workers. To
reduce sampling variability, the chart shows 5-year centered moving averages 
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What about college completion rates among prime-age workers? Figure 
4.18 shows the rates of four-year college completion among 35–54 year-
olds in the ﬁ  ve and a half decades after 1950. Prime-age males reached 
a peak rate of college completion in the late 1980s. There has been essen-
tially no rise in prime-age men’s college completion since that time. Of 
course, college attainment in this population mainly reﬂ  ects educational 
decisions that were made at least a decade, and sometimes up to three 
decades, earlier. Very few 45-year-old men think seriously about enroll-
ing in college. This middle-aged group is not a population segment where 
we would expect to see an instantaneous response to a bigger college pay 
premium. The college completion rate among prime-age women has risen 
much more steadily than the comparable rate among men. This probably 
reﬂ  ects the fact that a much bigger percentage of women now expects to 
earn a large fraction of their families’ total income over the course of their 
careers, raising the importance of obtaining a good educational credential 
that commands a premium in the labor market.
The educational decisions that should respond fastest to changes in 
wage signals are those made by adolescents and young adults between 16 
and 24 years of age. In most states 16 years is the oldest age for which 
Figure 4.17 
College Completion Rates of Americans Aged 25 to 34 Years, 1950–2006
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school attendance among youth is compulsory. Few people between 16 
and 24 years of age have to enroll in school if they do not wish to attend. 
Figure 4.19 shows trends in the number of years that young people are 
enrolled in school between the ages of 16 and 24 years. The Census 
Bureau conducts an annual household survey in October asking about   
school enrollment. The estimates displayed in Figure 4.19 show the total 
number of Octobers between ages 16 and 24 years that members of suc-
cessive birth cohorts have spent as enrollees in secondary school, col-
lege, or university. Someone enrolled in each October would have been 
enrolled for a total of nine years. The cumulative number of enrollment 
years rose from 2.9 years for 24-year-old men in 1955 to 4.5 years for 
24-year-old men attaining in 1971. For 24-year-old men in the ﬁ  rst half 
of the 1980s, the cumulative number of enrollment years fell below 4.0 
years. From 1986 to 1998 the number of enrollment years increased, 
but for male cohorts attaining age 24 in years after 1998, the number of 
enrollment years has stagnated or declined slightly. In 2005 24-year-old 
young men accumulated only slightly more years of school enrollment 
than 24-year old men in the early 1970s. These enrollment trends seem 
Figure 4.18 
College Completion Rates of Americans Aged 35 to 54 Years, 1950–2006
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puzzling in view of the fact that the male pay premium for completing a 
four-year college degree increased from 28 percent in 1980 to 51 percent 
in the late 1990s. The pay premium for obtaining a postcollege degree 
increased from 39 percent to 76 percent over the same period. Tuition, 
one component of college costs, increased over that period. However, 
another big component of enrollment costs fell— the opportunity cost of 
being enrolled in school. When the real wages of male high school drop-
outs and high school graduates declined, the foregone earnings of young 
men enrolled in school also declined.
The years young U.S. women spend enrolled in school have increased 
more steadily over time. Since 1997, 24-year-old women have accumu-
lated more years of schooling than 24-year-old men. Female enrollment 
rates, however, do not show a clear pattern of response to the rise in the 
pay premium commanded by a four-year college degree. Women’s enroll-
ment rates rose rapidly between the 1960s and early 1980s, when the 
female college premium shrank, and these rates did not rise any faster 
when the college pay premium soared after the early 1980s.
Figure 4.19 
U.S. Trends in Educational Enrollment for Americans Aged 16 to 24 Years,
1955–2006
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It is worth comparing trends in school attainment in the United States 
with educational trends in other rich countries. Tertiary school completion 
rates have been calculated by the Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) for a number of OECD-member countries. 
Tertiary schooling is deﬁ  ned as educational attainment that goes beyond 
a secondary degree but falls short of four-year college completion. Figure 
4.20 contains results for 22 OECD countries. Each square indicates the 
tertiary completion rate among people who were between 45 and 54 
years old in 2003. Each triangle indicates the rate of tertiary completion 
among people who were between 25 and 34 years old in the same year. 
By comparing the two tertiary completion rates, we have a rough indica-
tor of the trend in tertiary completion in each country.
This comparison suggests the United States has seen little trend change 
in its tertiary completion rate over the past 20 years. Note that this esti-
mate combines the completion rates of both men and women. There are a 
couple of other countries where tertiary completion rates have also been 
stagnant, notably New Zealand and Germany. By and large, however, 
most OECD countries have seen increases in their tertiary completion 
rate. In many countries, the gains have been substantial. Note that in the 
older age group, adults between 45 and 54 years of age, the United States 
has the highest tertiary completion rate of any of the 22 countries. In the 
younger age group, people between 25 and 34 years of age, the United 
States ranks only eighth out of the 22 countries for tertiary completion. 
Among these countries, the United States may have experienced the big-
gest increase in the gross ﬁ  nancial payoff to obtaining a postsecondary 
educational degree. The wage premium for attainment of a postsecondary 
degree, meaning a four-year college degree or a postcollege degree, was 
typically larger in the United States than it was in other industrial coun-
tries in 1970s, and the premium increased more in the United States than 
it did in most other countries after 1979. In the face of bigger increases 
in the college pay premium, why have tertiary completion rates remained 
stagnant in the United States? 
   One explanation is the country’s high rate of immigration. Although 
immigrants have a college graduation rate that is close to that of native-
born Americans, immigrants also have exceptionally low rates of high 
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than native-born residents who are the same age, and many children of 
immigrants fail to enroll in or to complete college. Since immigrants and 
immigrants’ children are a rising percentage of the U.S. resident popula-
tion, the trends shown in Figures 4.17 through 4.20 show slower educa-
tional progress than we would see if U.S. immigration rates were lower 
or if admitted immigrants had more schooling. 
Another explanation for Americans’ slow educational progress is 
that school institutions have captured part of the increase in the edu-
cational pay premium. This has been accomplished by charging higher 
prices, mainly for tuition and fees. Most economists recognize that this 
cost increase has been partly or entirely offset by the declining opportu-
nity cost of attending college. As young people’s wages, especially young 
men’s wages, have declined, their cost of delaying entry into the work-
force has fallen. Nonetheless, a stubbornly high percentage of young 
American men has failed to attend or complete college.
Another possible explanation is a rise in the perceived risk in the pay-
off of attending a postsecondary institution. The college pay premium 
has increased on average, but so too has the variance around the average 
graduate’s pay. There may be a bigger risk that workers with just one 
or two years of college will earn a lower wage than the average wage 
earned by a high school graduate. For instance, a high-school graduate 
who works as a plumber may well earn more than a community-college 
graduate who might work as a store clerk. However, it would require a 
very strong degree of risk aversion for far-sighted workers to remain out 
of college as a result of the increased uncertainty of college graduates’ 
pay.
Why are college enrollment rates rising in other rich countries but 
remaining relatively constant in the United States? One possibility is that 
U.S. teenagers and young adults do not know how to perform the beneﬁ  t-
cost calculations that would inform them of the ﬁ  nancial advantages of 
college attendance. Compulsory schooling laws provide some protection 
against the shortsightedness of 15-year-olds. State laws oblige 15-year-
olds to attend school. Among people between 16 and 24 years of age, 
the main protection against short-sighted decisions is the inﬂ  uence of 
a rational and far-sighted parent. Upper middle-class and middle-class 
parents have many resources with which to bribe their youngsters. Some 
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parents pay for the full cost of a child’s tuition and college room and 
board, and others pay a substantial part of the charges that are not cov-
ered by ﬁ  nancial aid. A great deal of evidence suggests these parental 
bribes are successful in persuading middle-income and afﬂ  uent children 
to attend college. Recent increases in college enrollment have been con-
centrated among young adults in the middle class and especially in the 
upper middle class.2 In contrast, poorer parents have fewer resources to 
inﬂ  uence their children’s secondary and postsecondary educational deci-
sions. Many low-income students cannot borrow enough money or work 
enough hours to pay their college bills while simultaneously maintaining 
an acceptable grade point average. For students who do not particularly 
enjoy schoolwork, the decision about whether to attend college may 
depend on whether their parents bribe them to attend. When returns 
to higher education rise, far-sighted parents will want their children to 
attend college. But while afﬂ  uent parents can inﬂ  uence their children’s 
decisions by offering to pay, poor parents cannot. As a result, afﬂ  uent 
students respond to changes in the long-term beneﬁ  ts of obtaining a col-
lege education, while poor students respond mainly to changes in the 
short-term costs of attending college.
An explanation for the divergence between educational attainment 
trends in the United States and other industrial countries may be that 
U.S. postsecondary institutions charge much higher fees than counterpart 
institutions in other rich countries. For that reason, the short-term cost of 
attending college may loom larger in the decisions made by adolescents 
and their parents. Most rich countries impose low charges on the stu-
dents who qualify for admission to college, and a few routinely provide 
generous subsidies to cover the living expenses of enrolled students. It 
is of course possible in the United States for low- and moderate-income 
students to obtain generous ﬁ  nancial aid or to enroll in low-cost public 
institutions, at least for the ﬁ  rst two years of college. But many eligible 
students may not apply to college if they do not realize how much aid is 
available. Others do not apply because the short-term costs of attending 
seem large in relation to the distant and uncertain income gains they may 
achieve as a college graduate. While adolescents and young adults may 
be equally short-sighted and ill-informed in all industrial countries, the 
United States is unusual in imposing such high and erratic direct costs on How Structural Shifts in Labor Demand Affect Labor Supply Prospects 238
students who may enroll in college. The evidence in Autor’s paper and in 
Figures 4.17 through 4.20 strongly suggests that the supply response to 
bigger college pay premiums in the United States has been too sluggish 
and too small to bring the college premium back to its level in the 1960s 
and 1970s.
Notes
1.  The basic time trends are similar if I perform regressions based on all workers 
who earn at least $1 per year in wages or net self-employment income. In order 
to offset the effects of year-to-year changes in the Census Bureau’s top-coding 
procedures, I top-coded earnings in every year using a simple and uniform pro-
cedure. Reported earnings that exceeded the 97th percentile of male earnings 
in a given year were recoded to the 97th percentile value for male earners, and 
earnings reports that exceeded the 99th percentile of female earnings in a given 
year were recoded to the 99th percentile value for female earners. This procedure 
means that the estimated education premiums do not capture the full earnings 
advantage enjoyed by well-educated earners in the top 3 percent of the male 
earnings distribution and in the top 1 percent of the female distribution. Thus, 
the estimates almost certainly understate the increase in the education premium, 
especially for men.
2. David Ellwood and Thomas Kane, “Who Is Getting A College Education? 
Family Background and the Growing Gaps in Enrollment,” in Sheldon Danziger 
and Jane Waldfogel, eds., Securing the Future (New York: Russell Sage, 2000).
5
The Cyclical Sensitivity of Labor Supply